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THE LOTTERY DOCKET
Daniel Epps* & William Ortman**
We propose supplementing the Supreme Court’s caseload with a “lottery
docket” of cases selected at random from final judgments of the circuit courts.
The Court currently possesses almost unfettered authority to set its own
agenda through its certiorari jurisdiction. By rule and custom, the Court exer-
cises that discretion by selecting cases that it sees as important, in a narrow
sense of that term. The Court’s free hand in agenda setting has obvious bene-
fits, but it has drawbacks as well. It deprives the Court of critical information
about how the law operates in ordinary cases. It signals to circuit courts that
their decisions are unreviewable—and thus unaccountable—in unimportant
cases. And it passes over many cases that are important in a less narrow sense.
The Court uses the existence of a circuit split to identify cases as important,
but splits are merely proxies for, not measures of, importance. While many
issues selected through the certiorari process are important, not all important
issues are selected by certiorari.
More fundamentally, we question the premise that only “important” cases
deserve the Court’s attention. The legal system would be improved if every
Term, the Supreme Court were forced to decide some unquestionably unim-
portant cases—run-of-the-mill appeals dealing with the kinds of legal ques-
tions that the lower courts resolve every day. Over the long run, a lottery
docket would offset the pathologies of the certiorari system without depriving
the Court of its ability to resolve questions that have divided the lower courts.
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Introduction
The Supreme Court today has nearly boundless power to decide which
cases it will hear. This was not always so. Until 1891, litigants in many clas-
ses of cases could appeal to the Supreme Court as a matter of right.1 As late
as 1988, the Supreme Court was obligated to hear any case in which a federal
court invalidated a state or federal statute on constitutional grounds.2 But
for almost thirty years, with the expansion of certiorari jurisdiction, the
Court’s power to set its own agenda has been nearly limitless.3 By rule and
custom, the Court exercises its discretion by selecting cases that are impor-
tant, in a narrow sense of that term. Most commonly, the Court deems cases
worth hearing if they turn on questions of law that divide the lower courts.4
1. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1650–51 (2000).
2. See Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to
Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81, 90 (1988).
3. See infra Section I.A.
4. See infra Section I.A.
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Critiques of the Court’s agenda-selection practices have mounted in re-
cent years. Critics complain that the Court hears too few cases,5 that it ig-
nores particular areas of law,6 and that its docket has been “captured” by an
elite Supreme Court bar.7 Few, however, question certiorari’s basic pre-
mise—that only legally important matters deserve the Court’s attention. All
seem to agree that the Supreme Court should devote itself to resolving the
important cases; the quarrel concerns how the Court should identify which
cases are important, and how many of those it should hear each year.
This Article questions the premise that only “important” cases deserve
the Court’s attention. We argue that the legal system would benefit if, every
Term, the Supreme Court were forced to decide some unquestionably unim-
portant cases—some run-of-the-mill appeals dealing with the kinds of ordi-
nary and seemingly inconsequential legal questions that the lower courts
resolve every day. Specifically, we propose that the Court—or Congress, by
statute—supplement the traditional certiorari docket with a small number
of cases randomly selected from final judgments of the circuit courts.8 This
proposal would, unquestionably, mean that the Court would end up devot-
ing time to some seemingly trivial cases. But though the Supreme Court’s
attention is a scarce resource, spending some of it this way could provide
surprising benefits. Getting the Supreme Court to hear a few more ostensi-
bly unimportant cases could help advance deeply important goals.
The argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, we begin with some back-
ground on the history of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. We then explain
the Court’s current certiorari process. The Court uses a set of proxies—
principally, the existence of a circuit split—to identify legally important
cases in which to grant certiorari.9 This approach has obvious advantages.
5. See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 403, 432–38; Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The
Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1363, 1378–82 (2006). In its October Term
2014, the Supreme Court decided 74 cases on their merits. See The Supreme Court, 2014
Term—The Statistics, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 381 (2015) [hereinafter The Statistics, October
Term 2014] (noting that the Court issued opinions in seventy-four cases during OT 2014).
Thirty years earlier, in the October Term of 1984, the Court decided 151 merits cases. See The
Supreme Court, 1984 Term—The Statistics, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 322 (1985) (noting that the
Court issued 151 opinions during OT 1984).
6. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Is It Important to Be Important?: Evaluating the Supreme
Court’s Case-Selection Process, 119 Yale L.J. Online 77, 81–82 (2009), https://
www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/839_rgqgoasj.pdf [http://perma.cc/AZZ4-8T2Q]; Carolyn Sha-
piro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging Versus Error Correction in the
Supreme Court, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 271, 296–313 (2006).
7. Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the Supreme Court, 119 Yale L.J. Online 89,
89–90 (2009), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/841_89m7e6cx.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9J3-
LNXL].
8. For a number of reasons that will become clear, the main thrust of our proposal is
limited to review of decisions by the lower federal courts, as opposed to state courts of last
resort. Later, however, we consider the possibility that the proposal could include review of
state court judgments as well. See infra Section III.C.
9. See infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
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Most critically, it enables the Court to unify federal law by resolving ques-
tions that have divided the lower courts.10
But this approach introduces pathologies as well—for the Court, the
judiciary, and the development of federal law. First, because the justices hear
only “important” cases, they are isolated from the day-to-day work of the
lower federal courts in ordinary, “unimportant” cases. This means that the
justices are systemically deprived of information about how statutes, regula-
tions, and even their own decisions play out in the mine-run of cases.11
Second, when a circuit court decides a legally unimportant case—that is, a
fact-bound case or a case not plausibly implicating a circuit split—it knows
that the chance of Supreme Court review is practically nil. In such cases
(which, we suspect, constitute the vast majority) the circuit court lacks the
accountability that traditional models of judicial hierarchy—not to mention
sound institutional design—presuppose.12 Third, the existence of a circuit
split is only a proxy for legal importance, not a measure of it, and is thus
inevitably imperfect. The Court’s reliance on circuit splits to recognize legal
importance misfires in systematic and predictable ways. In other words,
while many, or even most, legal issues selected through the certiorari process
are important, not all important legal issues are selected by certiorari.13
In Part II, we propose the “lottery docket”: a mechanism that could
offset the pathologies of the certiorari system without depriving the Court of
its ability to resolve questions that have divided the lower courts. Section
II.A provides the basic outline of the proposal. Specifically, we propose that,
either through Court rule or congressional enactment, the Court’s docket be
expanded to include a small number of cases—perhaps twenty to forty—
drawn at random from final judgments of the circuit courts. The goal would
be to add enough cases to provide key benefits while not imposing such
great demands on the Court’s attention to distract significantly from the
certiorari docket. Section II.B explains the many benefits of this proposal.
Over the long run, it would expose the justices to a more representative
range of cases and issues that confront federal courts, counteracting certio-
rari’s informational pathology.14 It would provide greater accountability
over circuit courts, as circuit judges would recognize that their decisions
have some chance of being reviewed even in the most quotidian cases.15 And,
again over the long run, it would permit the justices to hear and decide
important legal questions that lack the traditional indicia of importance.16
Section II.C goes on to defend the lottery docket against several objec-
tions. First, we consider whether there are any constitutional obstacles in
implementing this proposal, and find none. Though resolving the merits of a
10. See infra text accompanying notes 125–126.
11. See infra Section I.B.1.
12. See infra Section I.B.2.
13. See infra Section I.B.3.
14. See infra Section II.B.1.
15. See infra Section II.B.2.
16. See infra Section II.B.3.
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case using a random-decision procedure (like flipping a coin) could violate
due process, there is no reason to conclude that randomly choosing cases for
review is unconstitutional. Selecting a case for review is not a decision on
the merits of the case, and traditionally, randomization in nonmerits deci-
sionmaking is viewed as permissible.17 Second, we ask whether selecting
cases for review via a lottery is somehow unfair or illegitimate. We conclude
that this procedure would be fairer to litigants than the current system be-
cause it would give those who experience erroneous rulings by circuit courts
an additional chance to have those errors corrected.18
Third, we confront the objection that our proposal would waste the
Court’s scarce resources; any time dealing with lottery cases means less time
dealing with the rest of the Court’s caseload. We accept that there is a trade-
off here, but we argue that the benefits outweigh the costs, especially if the
number of lottery cases is small enough so as not to detract seriously from
the certiorari docket.19 Finally, we consider the problem of forgone “percola-
tion.” One argument for the Court’s circuit split–focused certiorari process
is that the Court will make better decisions after a legal issue has sufficiently
“percolated”—that is, after a number of courts of appeals have examined the
issue and aired all the best arguments on both sides of the issue. Forcing the
Court to decide legal issues through mandatory appeals could short-circuit
this process too early. Although this objection is not without force, percola-
tion itself is costly—it can permit erroneous views to persist in the lower
courts for years or decades longer than they might otherwise, causing signif-
icant harm to litigants in the process. Moreover, where a legal issue seems
particularly in need of percolation, it is possible the Court can decide the
case on narrow grounds in order to preserve room for further lower court
consideration.20
In Part III, we consider a number of more fine-grained design questions
involved in implementing the proposal. Should all decisions of the circuit
courts be included in the lottery, or should litigants affirmatively have to opt
in?21 Should the lottery be weighted to prioritize categories of cases under-
represented on the certiorari docket?22 And should state court decisions (as
opposed to merely decisions of the federal courts of appeals) be entitled to
enter the lottery?23 Rather than provide firm answers to these questions, we
merely indicate the relevant considerations that would have to be analyzed
in attempting to answer them.
We are ultimately agnostic about many of the finer details. We are confi-
dent, however, that introducing some version of our lottery proposal to the
Supreme Court’s docket would be an improvement over the current system.
17. See infra Section II.C.1.
18. See infra Section II.C.2.
19. See infra Section II.C.3.
20. See infra Section II.C.4.
21. See infra Section III.A.
22. See infra Section III.B.
23. See infra Section III.C.
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Choosing a few cases through random selection would result in more im-
portant issues being correctly identified and decided by the Court, create
more accountability over the circuit courts, give the Court more informa-
tion, and give losing litigants some chance of having serious errors cor-
rected. As arbitrary and random as the certiorari process seems, introducing
more randomness is actually the best solution.
I. The Certiorari Process and Its Pathologies
This Part surveys the Court’s process for selecting cases. Section I.A ex-
plains the history and development of certiorari jurisdiction and how the
process works today. Section I.B identifies several problems with the Court’s
current case-selection process. Section I.C briefly reviews previous proposals
for reform of the certiorari process.
A. The Modern Certiorari Process
For the first century of its existence, the Supreme Court had no author-
ity to choose what cases it would decide.24 In the Judiciary Act of 1789,25
Congress gave the Court appellate jurisdiction over many decisions from the
circuit courts26 as well as state court decisions that “defeated rights set up by
the appellant under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.”27
For these cases, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction was mandatory;
if a writ of error was filed, the Court was obliged to resolve the case.28
The first glimmer of discretionary review appeared in 1891, when Con-
gress passed the Circuit Courts of Appeals Act.29 The Act was a response to a
perceived crisis with the Court’s increasingly unmanageable caseload; at the
start of the 1890 Term, the justices had a backlog of 1,800 cases.30 Congress’s
24. Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1649.
25. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
26. The Act provided that the Supreme Court could examine, on a writ of error,
final judgments and decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit court, brought
there by original process, or removed there from courts of the several States, or removed
there by appeal from a district court where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or
value of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs.
Id. § 22. The Court also was granted original jurisdiction over several classes of cases. See id.
§ 13. Some of this jurisdiction was exclusive (for example, cases between two different states),
some was not (such as suits between a state and a citizen of another state). See id.
27. Akhil Reed Amar, Colloquy, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1519 (1990) (discussing section 25 of the Judiciary Act§ ). For a fascinat-
ing argument that Amar and others are wrong in concluding that section 25 granted the Su-
preme Court jurisdiction over state criminal prosecutions, see Kevin C. Walsh, In the
Beginning There Was None: Supreme Court Review of State Criminal Prosecutions, 90 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1867 (2015).
28. Amar, supra note 27, at 1519.
29. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
30. See H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States
Supreme Court 299 (1991); Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650.
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solution was to create a new set of federal courts—the circuit courts of ap-
peals—with appellate jurisdiction over various classes of decisions that pre-
viously would have been directly appealable to the Supreme Court.31 Some
of the circuit courts’ decisions were, in turn, appealable to the Supreme
Court.32 But for other types of cases, the Act declared, the judgments of the
circuit courts of appeals were “final.”33 Yet, for such “final” decisions, the
Act permitted “the Supreme Court to require, by certiorari or otherwise, any
such case to be certified to the Supreme Court for its review and determina-
tion with the same power and authority in the case as if it had been carried
by appeal or writ of error to the Supreme Court.”34
This language was the first step of a radical change in the Supreme
Court’s role. There is little indication, however, that the Act’s drafters un-
derstood that they were sparking a revolution.35 Instead, the inclusion of the
certiorari power “was envisioned as a sort of fallback provision.”36 As Peter
Linzner put it:
[T]he draftsmen of the 1891 Act intended the specific reference to certio-
rari not to create a totally new statutory form of discretionary appeal but
simply to serve as a safety valve to permit the Supreme Court, by use of
common law certiorari, occasionally to take up important cases, primarily
involving conflicts between circuits, in areas of law as to which the circuit
courts of appeals had “final” jurisdiction.37
It is thus unsurprising that “[t]he Court did not immediately exploit the
potential of discretionary jurisdiction,” granting certiorari writs only twice
in the two years after the 1891 statute’s enactment.38 But within a short time,
the use of certiorari grew to encompass nearly a fifth of the Supreme Court’s
docket.39 The scope of the Court’s discretionary power expanded further in
1914, when Congress extended certiorari review to state court judgments
upholding federal claims or defenses,40 and then again in 1916, when the
Webb Act expanded the list of judgments considered “final” but reviewable
on certiorari.41
Perhaps the most significant change, however, occurred in 1925 with the
passage of the “Judges’ Bill.”42 The legislation acquired this nickname both
31. See Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1227,
1232–33 (1979).
32. See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650.
33. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 6, 26 Stat. at 828.
34. Id.
35. See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1655.
36. Id. at 1656.
37. Linzer, supra note 31, at 1235–36 (footnotes omitted).
38. Doris Marie Provine, Case Selection in the United States Supreme Court 10
(1980).
39. Id. at 10–11.
40. See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1657.
41. See Linzer, supra note 31, at 1238–39.
42. See Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936.
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because it was written by the Supreme Court justices themselves and because
“a delegation from the Court, led by Chief Justice Taft, energetically lobbied
on its behalf.”43 For years, Taft in particular had sought to reduce the
Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction and “increase the Court’s ‘absolute
and arbitrary’ discretion.”44 The bill accomplished Taft’s goals: it made
nearly all decisions by the federal appellate courts final and thus reviewable
only by certiorari.45 The impact of the Judges’ Bill in reshaping the role and
conception of the Court was tremendous. The Court’s newfound “ability to
set its own agenda permitted it to ‘shed the long-standing image of a neutral
arbiter and an interpreter of policy’ and emerge ‘as an active participant in
making policy.’ ”46
Congress continued tinkering with the Court’s docket in the years to
come, but the trend was consistently in favor of reducing the Court’s
mandatory jurisdiction.47 Indeed, the justices themselves (including, for ex-
ample, Chief Justice Rehnquist) demanded ever greater discretionary
power.48 Finally, in the 1988 Judiciary Act,49 Congress virtually eliminated
the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction.50 This Act was “the ‘logical
culmination’ of the legislative trend that began in 1891.”51
Today, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is almost entirely dis-
cretionary. The Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction covers only (1) fi-
nal judgments by three-judge district courts, which are required by statute
for a few narrow categories of cases,52 and (2) final judgments by single-
43. Provine, supra note 38, at 11.
44. Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1661; see also Perry, supra note 30, at 301 (“Reforming the
judiciary was a passion of William Howard Taft. First as President, then as chief justice, he
worked tirelessly toward this aim. Nowhere is this better seen than in his involvement with
drafting and advocating the act of 1925.”); Jeffery R. Lax, Certiorari and Compliance in the
Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and the Rule of Four, 15 J. Theoretical Pol. 61, 63
(2003).
45. We say “nearly” all because, under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, all decisions striking down
federal statutes—whether by district or circuit courts—were directly appealable to the Su-
preme Court. This provision was, however, repealed in 1988. See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662.
46. Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1718 (quoting Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., The Transfor-
mation of the Supreme Court’s Agenda: From the New Deal to the Reagan Adminis-
tration 15 (1991)).
47. See Provine, supra note 38, at 13 (“Between 1970 and 1976 Congress eliminated a
series of the remaining provisions allowing appeals to the Supreme Court directly from district
courts.”).
48. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 Colum. L.
Rev. 929, 970 & n.225 (2013) (“In successive letters to Congress, the Court sought a dramatic
extension of certiorari jurisdiction to enable it to settle important federal questions.”).
49. Act of June 27, 1988.
50. See Grove, supra note 48, at 976–77.
51. Id. at 977 (quoting S. Rep. No. 100-300, at 2 (1988)).
52. Cases in which three-judge district courts are required by statute include constitu-
tional challenges to the apportionment of legislative districts, see 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2012),
cases in which the court orders the release of prisoners as a remedy for prison conditions, see
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B) (2012), and cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 where the
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judge district courts in certain antitrust decisions that the district court cer-
tifies for direct review by the Supreme Court.53 The Court hears oral argu-
ment in only a handful of mandatory appeals each year,54 and it decides a
slightly larger number of appeals through summary affirmances.55
Instead, most of the cases the Court hears come from its certiorari
docket. This is not to say that the Court decides most of the cases on the
certiorari docket. From approximately 7,000–8,000 certiorari petitions every
year,56 the Court grants review in fewer than ninety per year.57
Winnowing down the thousands of certiorari petitions to the small
number of granted cases presents no small challenge for the Court. Unsur-
prisingly, the Court has established “various internal streamlining devices”
in order to reduce the work involved in dealing with certiorari petitions.58
One such shortcut is institutional. Since 1972, many justices have combined
the efforts of their chambers in the “cert pool.”59 In this pool, certiorari
petitions are divided among the chambers of participating justices; for any
attorney general certifies that the case is of general public importance, see 42 U.S.C §§ 2000a-
5, 2000e-6 (2012). For a more complete list, see Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court
Practice 104–19 (10th ed. 2013).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 29(b) (2012). Only three such appeals have been certified for direct re-
view since 1974. See Shapiro et al., supra note 52, at 92.
54. As of 1988, when the Court was still hearing 150 cases per Term, only 20% of the
Court’s cases came from the mandatory appellate docket. See Boskey & Gressman, supra note
2, at 88. In the nearly three decades since, that percentage has shrunk significantly further. For
example, in October Term 2015, the Court heard oral argument in only three cases from the
appellate docket. See Granted & Noted List: Cases for Argument in October Term 2015, Sup. Ct.
U.S. (June 27, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/grantednotedlist/15grantednotedlist
[https://perma.cc/V3SG-99F9].
55. See Statistics as of June 27, 2013, J. Sup. Ct. U.S., Oct. Term 2013, at II, III, https://
www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal/jnl13.pdf [https://perma.cc/57LF-FT67] (noting that,
for October Term 2012, the Court summarily affirmed four mandatory appeals but only noted
probable jurisdiction in one). A denial of certiorari carries no precedential value. See United
States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923) (“The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no
expression of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times.”). A
summary affirmance, by contrast, is a decision on the merits entitled to precedential weight.
See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343–45 (1975) (holding that lower courts must follow
Supreme Court summary affirmances). That said, by all appearances, “the Justices consider the
merits of an appeal only cursorily when they decide whether to grant it plenary review with
full briefs and oral argument.” Linzer, supra note 31, at 1298. Indeed, this cursory considera-
tion is perhaps why the Court has in recent decades made clear that, though still precedential,
“a summary affirmance . . . has ‘considerably less precedential value than an opinion on the
merits.’ ” Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1800 (2015) (quoting
Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180–81 (1979)).
56. FAQs—General Information, Sup. Ct. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
faq_general.aspx [https://perma.cc/3ES4-DF46]; see also The Statistics, October Term 2014,
supra note 5, at 389 (noting that the Supreme Court considered 7,038 certiorari petitions
during October Term 2014).
57. Shapiro et al., supra note 52, at 63.
58. Boskey & Gressman, supra note 2, at 87.
59. See Shapiro et al., supra note 52, at 318–19.
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given petition, only one law clerk prepares a memorandum with a recom-
mendation that is then shared with the other justices and their clerks.60
Originally created at the suggestion of Justice Powell, only five justices ini-
tially participated.61 Today, seven of the nine justices participate, with Jus-
tices Alito and Gorsuch as the two holdouts.62
Another shortcut is substantive: the Court has developed rules of thumb
for when certiorari is appropriate. Rather than requiring an all-things-con-
sidered judgment about a case’s importance in each instance, the Court has
identified criteria justifying a grant of certiorari, which it has codified in its
own Rule 10.63 The Rule lists several considerations that, “although neither
controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character
of the reasons the Court considers” when ruling on a petition:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with
the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same impor-
tant matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that con-
flicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned
such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s
supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in
a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or
of a United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an impor-
tant question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this
Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts
with relevant decisions of this Court.64
Rule 10’s criteria seem to capture what the justices themselves are look-
ing for in the certiorari process.65 As then–Chief Justice Rehnquist put it,
“[T]here really are only two or three factors involved in the certiorari deci-
sion—conflict with other courts, general importance, and perception that
60. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the
Certiorari Process, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 947, 953 (2007) (book review).
61. Shapiro et al., supra note 52, at 318–19.
62. Id. at 319 n.16; Adam Liptak, Gorsuch, in Sign of Independence, Is Out of Supreme
Court’s Clerical Pool, N.Y. Times (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/
politics/gorsuch-supreme-court-labor-pool-clerks.html?mcubz=2 (on file with the Michigan
Law Review). Before Justice Scalia’s death and eventual replacement with Justice Gorsuch,
eight of the nine justices participated in the pool. See Shapiro et al., supra note 52, at 319
n.16.
63. Sup. Ct. R. 10.
64. Id.
65. In the discussion that follows, we make broad generalizations about what the justices
collectively are looking for in the certiorari process. We recognize, however, that there may be
significant variation in preferences among individual justices—and perhaps especially among
those of the justices who have chosen to leave the pool. Because justices rarely, if ever, explain
their votes to grant certiorari, a more nuanced, justice-by-justice account would be difficult to
provide. See Stras, supra note 60, at 971 n.154.
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the decision is wrong in light of Supreme Court precedent.”66 Of these, the
paramount factor is the presence of a “split”—that is, a difference of opin-
ion on a pure question of law between the federal courts of appeals or state
courts of last resort. One study of the Supreme Court’s docket from 2003 to
2005 concluded that approximately 70% of the cases granted involved such a
conflict between lower courts.67 An unsurprising corollary is that petitions
involving a lower court conflict have a much higher chance of being granted
than average. A study of nearly 2,000 petitions considered during the 1982
Term concluded that 70% of petitions alleging a verifiable conflict in the
lower courts were granted, compared to 7.6% overall.68
The Court’s emphasis on splits is often attributed to the important role
that law clerks play in the process. Clerks, inexperienced young lawyers who
are usually only a year or two out of law school, “seek objectively verifiable
criteria like circuit splits and are unlikely to recommend a grant based on a
belief, for example, that the lower court was simply wrong.”69 Indeed,
Artemus Ward and David Weiden argue that “[w]ith the creation of the cert
pool in 1972, clerks increasingly emphasized circuit conflict. . . . This ten-
dency then spread to nonpool clerks, and even attorneys, as normative iso-
morphic change occurred.”70
A split is not the only proxy the justices look for in the certiorari pro-
cess. Other indicia of importance matter as well. For example, the fact that
the U.S. solicitor general (or “SG”) files a certiorari petition provides good
reason to think that the case involves an issue of national importance. The
Court thus grants more than half of the petitions filed by the solicitor gen-
eral, compared to 3% for other petitions in paid cases.71 The presence (and
quantity) of amicus briefs at the certiorari stage can also indicate that an
issue is important: the fact that other individuals or organizations are will-
ing to spend time and money on the case is a pretty good reason to think
that the case has implications that extend beyond the immediate parties.
66. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court 235 (rev. ed. 2001).
67. See Stras, supra note 60, at 982.
68. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in
the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1109, 1116 (1988).
69. Carolyn Shapiro, The Law Clerk Proxy Wars: Secrecy, Accountability, and Ideology in
the Supreme Court, 37 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 101, 128 (2009).
70. Artemus Ward & David L. Weiden, Sorcerers’ Apprentices: 100 Years of Law
Clerks at the United States Supreme Court 132 (2006). To be sure, the justices do not
follow the clerks’ recommendations blindly. One study which analyzed two separate Terms’
worth of cert pool memoranda concluded that “the Court only took the action suggested by a
cert-pool memo in approximately half the cases that were granted review.” Barbara Palmer,
The “Bermuda Triangle?” The Cert Pool and Its Influence over the Supreme Court’s Agenda, 18
Const. Comment. 105, 106 (2001). Nonetheless, it is hard to contest that splits matter in the
certiorari process, and it seems likely that the rise of the cert pool has had something to do
with that.
71. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 389, 408
(2004).
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One study thus found that the Court was significantly more likely to grant a
petition when amicus briefs were present.72
Although Rule 10 indicates that the Court will consider whether a lower
court decision contradicts Supreme Court precedent when evaluating a cer-
tiorari petition,73 petitions seeking merely “error correction” are in practice
rarely granted. Indeed, the justices themselves are quick to tell us this. For
example, in a recent solo opinion, Justice Alito noted his agreement with the
Court’s decision to deny certiorari despite strongly disagreeing with the de-
cision under review on the merits, because “we are not a court of error
correction.”74
The Court’s refusal to engage in error correction is part and parcel of its
self-seized role as the arbiter of only the most important legal issues. As
Carolyn Shapiro puts it, the Court
has cast itself not as a source of justice for individual litigants or the forum
to correct aberrations in the application of law, but rather as providing the
structure and guidance necessary for the lower courts to correct or avoid
errors. Necessarily, then, the Court must sometimes forego involving itself
in cases where, although the result may be wrong, the case presents no
issues of larger concern.75
Though the Court occasionally summarily reverses to correct what it per-
ceives as egregious errors—especially in certain areas of law76—such use of
certiorari is rare, occurring only a handful of times in a term.77 And the
Court is especially reluctant to correct errors when the conflict with Su-
preme Court precedent involves a misapplied legal standard, as opposed to
an incorrect statement of a pure legal issue: Rule 10 explicitly warns litigants
that “[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted
72. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 68, at 1115–16 (analyzing the 1982 Term and
concluding that petitions with at least one amicus brief were granted 36% of the time).
73. The Rule explicitly states that whether a state court decision “conflicts with relevant
decisions of this Court” is a factor in granting cert. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). Rule 10 also makes
clear that certiorari is warranted if a circuit court decision has “so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power,” a category which presuma-
bly includes decisions that ignore binding Supreme Court precedent. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a).
74. Martin v. Blessing, 134 S. Ct. 402, 405 (2013) (Alito, J., respecting denial of
certiorari).
75. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 279.
76. In recent years, the Court has appeared especially eager to overturn lower court deci-
sions that failed to heed the limits on habeas relief for state prisoners in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act. See, e.g., Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372 (2015) (per curiam);
Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37 (2012) (per curiam); Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65 (2011) (per
curiam). For the best scholarly analysis of the Court’s recent summary-reversal practice, see
William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1,
18–40 (2015).
77. Baude reports that between October Term 2005 and October Term 2013, there were
on average 6.2 summary reversals per Term. Baude, supra note 76, at 22.
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error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a prop-
erly stated rule of law.”78
The foregoing picture, to be sure, lacks some fine details. For example,
we have glossed over the fact that certiorari standards vary somewhat from
justice to justice. As Margaret and Richard Cordray have observed, records
of the Court’s deliberations that have been made public show that different
justices appear to weigh different considerations when voting on certiorari
matters.79 Whether justices vote to grant certiorari depends on their view of
the Court’s role and their underlying judicial philosophy.80 Despite these
nuances, though, the picture of the process that we have sketched here—one
in which splits and a couple of other proxies for importance dominate—is
certainly adequate for present purposes. Having described how the process
works, the next Section turns to normative evaluation.
B. Problems with the Current Process
The Court’s approach to its certiorari docket represents a number of
compromises. The justices must spend significant time dealing with the
cases they hear on the merits if they hope to get the right bottom line and to
write strong opinions that will be useful to the lower courts. So some short-
cuts for dealing with the vast quantity of certiorari petitions the Court re-
ceives each year are necessary. No critique of current arrangements can
ignore the reality that the Court has a finite reserve of attention, and the
Court cannot and should not spend it all at the screening stage. Nonetheless,
there are reasons to worry that the justices may not always strike the right
balance in deciding what to decide.
We focus on three different, but related, critiques. First, the current pro-
cess—by focusing attention on a narrow subset of cases—deprives the Court
of valuable information about what is happening in the lower courts. Sec-
ond, the Court’s emphasis on particular criteria creates an accountability
deficit, because lower courts realize that certain cases are effectively immune
from Supreme Court review. Finally, the Court’s proxies for importance are
imperfect and thus inevitably cause the Court to miss out on some issues
that are of unquestionable importance.81
78. Sup. Ct. R. 10.
79. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 71, at 418–22.
80. See id. at 422–49.
81. Our analysis here presumes a working theory of what the Court’s goals are with its
case-selection process, but we have not tried to spell out that theory at any length. Instead, we
rely on what we see as relatively uncontroversial assumptions about the purposes that the
Court’s case-selection process might serve. For a richer discussion of the relationship between
case selection and different models of the Court’s role, see Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Poja-
nowski, Discretionary Dockets, 31 Const. Comment. 221 (2016).
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1. Information
There is little doubt that many of the cases that survive the certiorari
crucible are legally important.82 This makes sense. The Supreme Court’s pri-
mary role is to decide the hardest and most important questions.83 Paradoxi-
cally, though, the all-certiorari docket may diminish the Court’s ability to
get the right answers to important questions.
The problem is that the certiorari docket restricts the justices’ knowl-
edge of the legal landscape. It is hard to deny that, at least in some sense,
Supreme Court decisionmaking constitutes lawmaking.84 In deciding cases,
the Court is not solely concerned with reaching the right outcome in the
particular case at hand; an important part of its task is crafting doctrinal
rules that will lead to good results in future cases. Information is an essential
input to lawmaking. As Frederick Schauer notes, effective lawmaking re-
quires a “sense of what the array of future events, disputes, and decision-
making occasions will look like.”85 If they are to perform successfully,
lawmakers must know something about the types of cases that their rules
will control, and they must understand something about the distribution of
those cases.86 Outside the judiciary, lawmakers have many tools to learn
about the type and distribution of cases that prospective rules will govern.87
Judicial access to information is more circumscribed, since courts are typi-
cally barred from conducting their own nonlegal research.88
In theory, the courts’ informational deficit could be offset by the experi-
ence of deciding cases over time, which exposes judges to information about
the types and distribution of disputes involving particular legal rules. But
the type and distribution information that a judge gleans from judging will
be “correct” only if the cases that come before the judge are representative of
82. Not all, of course. See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the
Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1561
(2008) (“It is at the certiorari stage that many well-represented petitioners persuade the Court
to grant review in cases that may not be particularly certworthy . . . .”). As explained below,
moreover, this does not mean that the certiorari process is good at identifying all important
cases. It is not. See infra Section I.B.3.
83. See Raymond Lohier, The Court of Appeals as the Middle Child, 85 Fordham L. Rev.
945, 951 (2016) (“The Supreme Court now tends exclusively to the most controversial and
important questions of national law.”).
84. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts,
and the Nature of the “Judicial Power”, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 967, 994 (2000).
85. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883, 894 (2006); see
also Schauer, supra note 6, at 83 (“In order to perform the latter task adequately, however,
courts need to have some sense of the array of events that some putative rule, standard, policy,
or test will control.”).
86. Schauer, supra note 6, at 83–84.
87. This is particularly true of administrative agencies. See William Ortman, Chevron for
Juries, 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 1287, 1295 (2015).
88. See Bhagwat, supra note 84, at 998–99; Schauer, supra note 6, at 83.
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the disputes that the rule at issue governs. If the cases are skewed, so too will
be the judge’s understanding of the field.89
Therein lies the informational pathology of the certiorari process. Al-
though empirical analysis has yet to provide a complete account of how the
Supreme Court exercises its certiorari jurisdiction,90 it is clear that the Court
does not grant cases at random. Instead, as explained above, the justices
prefer cases with certain characteristics—most notably, circuit splits, as well
as petitions brought by the solicitor general.91 As a result, the cases the Su-
preme Court hears are not a representative sample of any larger population
of cases.92 The mix of cases in the certiorari docket does not resemble the
mix of cases in the federal circuits. It looks even less like the dockets of
district courts or the universe of disputes—to say nothing of the universe of
primary conduct—governed by the laws over which the Supreme Court has
the ultimate say.93
Schauer documents the lack of representativeness in the Supreme
Court’s docket by considering school-speech cases, which are common in
the lower courts but which the Supreme Court took up only four times in
the four decades before Schauer’s essay.94 One of the four cases, Schauer
explains, involved a bizarre fact pattern (a “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner)
that “was highly unrepresentative of the student speech cases that bedevil
the lower courts,” leading to an opinion that “provide[d] virtually no gui-
dance to the courts that have to deal with student speech issues.”95 Putting
the insight more generally, Carolyn Shapiro observes that the “the Court’s
current distance from the daily work of the lower courts may prevent Jus-
tices from ‘fully appreciat[ing] how the particular issue fits into its larger
89. To be sure, all but one of the current justices (Kagan) were circuit judges before being
elevated to the Supreme Court. That surely gives them perspective about the work of the
circuit courts at the time of their service. Yet the perspective is, for most justices, dated. Only
two of the current justices (Sotomayor and Gorsuch) were circuit judges in the last ten years.
As of 2017, on average (for the eight), roughly seventeen years have passed since their promo-
tion. And only Justice Sotomayor ever served as a district judge.
90. Lee Epstein et al., Setting the Nation’s Legal Agenda: Case Selection on
the U.S. Supreme Court 1–2 (2005), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/cert.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9BTB-9NFB] (“Analyses of agenda-setting have burgeoned and, yet—despite the im-
mense interest, the sheer amount of attention, the awards bestowed on books examining cert
in part or in full, the deployment of clever research strategies, and the employment of sophisti-
cated technologies—commentators do not agree on why Supreme Court justices make the
agenda-setting decisions that they do.”).
91. See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
92. Victoria F. Nourse, Response, Overrides: The Super-Study, 92 Tex. L. Rev. See Also
205, 209 (2014), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Nourse-92-
SeeAlso.pdf [https://perma.cc/A768-UFCR] (“The problem here is that Supreme Court deci-
sions are unlikely to be a representative sample; they differ from standard appellate decisions
along a number of dimensions.”).
93. Schauer, supra note 6, at 84.
94. Id. at 81–82.
95. Id. at 82 (discussing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)).
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setting.’ ”96 The internal mechanism for sorting certiorari petitions—the cert
pool—exacerbates the problem. As she explains, “[T]he cert pool insulates
the Justices themselves from the daily life of the lower courts, from the ordi-
nary but perhaps quite messy areas of law that are litigated every day.”97
The result is an informational deficit. Certiorari cases provide the Court
with limited information about how statutes, regulations, and even its own
prior decisions play out in ordinary cases.98 This has obvious consequences
for the quality of the Court’s decisions in the certiorari (i.e., legally impor-
tant) cases themselves.99 It is perhaps unsurprising that across substantive
areas, subject-matter experts accuse the Court of bungling its episodic forays
into their domains.100 Moreover, recent empirical research on district judges
corroborates the common sense proposition that judges get better at decid-
ing cases in a given area as they hear more cases.101 Because it denies the
justices access to accurate information about the type and distribution of
cases that legal rules govern, the all-certiorari docket makes judicial learning
of this sort less likely.102
96. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 329 (quoting Hellman, supra note 5, at 435 n.83); see also
Bhagwat, supra note 84, at 993.
97. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 286.
98. To some extent, this informational deficit might be offset by the Court’s summary-
reversal docket. See Baude, supra note 76, at 25. Perhaps in screening certiorari petitions for
summary-reversal candidates, the justices glean useful information about the work of the
lower courts generally. Yet given the small size of the summary-reversal docket, and its signifi-
cant focus on discrete case types—especially, as Baude notes, cases that “ensure that lower
courts follow Supreme Court precedents,” id. at 31—we doubt that this mechanism offers the
sort of useful information that a lottery would.
99. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the
Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 Duke L.J. 1439, 1471–72 (2009) (“This knowledge [about the
lower courts the Supreme Court monitors] should enable the Court to make better decisions
as it goes about its business.”).
100. See Jon C. Blue, A Well-Tuned Cymbal? Extrajudicial Political Activity, 18 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 1, 16–17 n.95 (2004) (“Many academic specialists feel that because judges are
required by the very nature of their positions to be generalists, they simply cannot acquire the
necessary expertise (i.e., the expertise held by an academic specialist) to master the intricacies
of particular legal disciplines.”). Indeed, many scholars across a range of different fields have
criticized the Court’s sporadic interventions. See David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of
Family Law, 42 Fam. L.Q. 529, 557 (2008) (family law); Schauer, supra note 6, at 81–82 (school
speech); Nancy C. Staudt, Agenda Setting in Supreme Court Tax Cases: Lessons from the Black-
mun Papers, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 889, 890 (2004) (tax); see also June Carbone, From Partners to
Parents Revisited: How Will Ideas of Partnership Influence the Emerging Definition of California
Parenthood?, 7 Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 3, 30 (2007) (“In the determination of
parentage, the Court seems to take up a significant issue roughly once a decade, rendering an
opinion that destabilizes existing law, and then departing the field.”).
101. See M. Todd Henderson & William H.J. Hubbard, Judicial Noncompliance with
Mandatory Procedural Rules Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 J. Legal
Stud. S87, S93 (2015) (finding support, in securities law context, for “learning account” of
judicial behavior, pursuant to which “[j]udges gain knowledge with experience, either directly
from cases that they work on, from other cases in their district, or from other sources”).
102. To be sure, under some judicial methodologies the kind of information discussed
here is irrelevant to the judge’s task. If the judge’s role is solely to divine the original meaning
of a text, facts about what is happening in the lower courts would be irrelevant to the judicial
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2. Accountability
The conventional view of the federal judicial hierarchy posits the Su-
preme Court as the ultimate supervisor of the federal courts. In theory, as
several political scientists put it, “the federal judicial hierarchy is designed to
enable the Supreme Court, sitting at the system’s apex, to impose its collec-
tive will on lower federal judges.”103 On this view, federal judges, and espe-
cially circuit judges, are accountable to the Supreme Court for their
decisions.104 In reality, though, the Supreme Court’s ability to monitor the
judicial output of the federal circuits—not to mention the federal district
courts the circuit courts supervise—is sharply circumscribed.105 The Court
can realistically review only a small fraction of circuit decisions, a fact that
attenuates the accountability of circuit judges and affords them wide berth
in adjudicating disputes and even, to an extent, charting the course of fed-
eral law.106
The federal judicial system’s lack of accountability at the circuit level is,
at first cut, an apparently intractable function of the relative docket sizes of
the circuits and the Court.107 In a system where the circuit courts decide
around 55,000 cases each year and the Court decides fewer than ninety,108
the prospect of Supreme Court review in any given case is necessarily small.
As Toby Heytens puts it, “[T]he Supreme Court simply lacks the capability
to engage in any sort of monitoring of the vast majority of . . . appellate
court decisions.”109
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s all-certiorari docket exacerbates the
circuits’ accountability gap in two important ways. First, it is often easy for
task. But, while some justices may put more or less emphasis on text and original meaning as
compared to other factors, we are skeptical that any justices are so single-mindedly focused on
text that information that they would be completely unaffected by information about the
potential consequences of different legal rules for the lower courts.
103. Susan B. Haire et al., Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchi-
cal Perspective, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 143, 143–44 (2003).
104. Cf. Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. Pa.
J. Const. L. 341, 381 (2004) (“For federal district judges, this intrabranch accountability rela-
tionship is vertical (review by a higher court), for Supreme Court justices it is horizontal (the
collective vote of colleagues), and for circuit judges it is in both directions.”).
105. Jennifer Barnes Bowie & Donald R. Songer, Assessing the Applicability of Strategic
Theory to Explain Decision Making on the Courts of Appeals, 62 Pol. Res. Q. 393 (2009) (find-
ing, through quantitative analysis and interviews with circuit judges, that the threat of Su-
preme Court reversal is largely irrelevant to judges on federal courts of appeals).
106. Cf. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Eve-
rybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 14 & n.22 (1993).
107. Id. at 7; see also C. Arlen Beam, Foreword, 30 Creighton L. Rev. 655, 656 (1997)
(noting the rarity with which circuit court judgments are reversed by the Supreme Court).
108. Compare U.S. Courts of Appeals—Judicial Business 2015, U.S. Courts, http://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business-2015 [https://
perma.cc/3TEM-VTNT], with Shapiro, supra note 52, at 63.
109. Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2045,
2055 n.40 (2008).
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circuit judges to discern when a case has no prospect of Supreme Court
review.110 That is, circuit judges can often ascertain that a case lacks any
novel or disputed legal question or high stakes for the nation’s economy or
politics. When that happens, the accountability isn’t merely attenuated; it is
nonexistent. Circuit decisions in such cases are both unaccountable and, rel-
ative to Supreme Court decisions, quite low profile. Scrutiny—by lawyers,
scholars, and often the media—imposes a kind of accountability on virtually
all Supreme Court decisions.111 Much less so the decisions of circuit courts,
which are often salient only to the litigants involved.112 In practical terms,
this means that circuit judges are free to dispose of cases with brief, unpub-
lished judgments containing little or no reasoning. As many scholars have
documented, per curiam judgments of this sort have been on a steady rise in
the circuit courts over recent decades.113
Second, the Court’s all-certiorari docket makes it possible for circuit
judges to insulate their decisions by (consciously or not) making them ap-
pear unimportant. This further weakens the accountability of circuit judges
for their decisions. There are two principal strategies. One is to decide cases
on grounds unlikely to attract the Supreme Court’s interest. There is empiri-
cal evidence that, at least in some contexts, circuit judges insulate decisions
that advance their ideological priors by deciding them on grounds that are
unlikely to interest the Supreme Court. Joseph Smith and Emerson Tiller
analyzed circuit decisions in EPA cases, which can be decided either (and
here we simplify the issues greatly) on grounds unattractive to the Supreme
Court—did the EPA act arbitrarily and capriciously?—or on statutory inter-
pretation grounds more likely to garner the Court’s attention.114 Smith and
110. See Bowie & Songer, supra note 105, at 397 (“Most of the judges [interviewed] indi-
cated that for at least a majority of the cases they heard, they were confident that the Court
would not grant cert, but for the remainder of their docket, it was difficult to predict which
cases would go up and which would not.”); id. (noting that one circuit judge stated that “he
did not know which cases would be reviewed, but he was pretty confident about some of the
types of cases that would not be reviewed,” and specifically identifying “criminal cases that
turn on the facts” as an example); see also Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial
Activism, 58 Emory L.J. 1195, 1223 (2009) (“[E]ven trial courts and courts of appeals make
unsupervised decisions in particular contexts, as with . . . cases that are clearly not
certworthy.”).
111. Cf. Tom Goldstein, The Transformation of Legal Journalism, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 895,
899 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court is “by and large . . . the only appellate court that
has ever received serious coverage”).
112. Diane P. Wood, Justice Harry A. Blackmun and the Responsibility of Judging, 26 Has-
tings Const. L.Q. 11, 13 (1998) (“In the courts of appeals, with very minor exceptions, our
appellate jurisdiction is mandatory, and we hear hundreds (if not thousands) of cases every
year that are of interest only to the immediate litigants.”).
113. See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Strange Fruit: What Happened to the United States Doctrine
of Precedent?, 60 Vill. L. Rev. 443, 446 (2015).
114. Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Adminis-
trative Law, 31 J. Legal Stud. 61 (2002). Smith and Tiller explain that statutory interpretation
decisions are more likely to attract Supreme Court review because of their “high policy impact
and decision transparency.” Id. at 65. “Reasoning process” cases, by contrast, have a “policy
impact” that is “more limited.” Id. at 66.
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Tiller found statistically significant evidence that the courts’ choices were
influenced by their ideological priors.115 That is, panels were more likely to
rule on process grounds, thereby reducing the chance of Supreme Court
review, when their decisions accorded with their ideological preferences than
when they did not.116 The second strategy is perhaps more pernicious. By
resolving unsettled legal questions in unpublished—and therefore nonbind-
ing—opinions, circuit judges can “sweep” important decisions “under the
rug,”117 as Judge Patricia Wald has described the practice.118 Having declared
its opinion nonprecedential, the circuit ensures that its decision does not
create a split of precedent worthy of Supreme Court review, making certio-
rari “even more remote than usual.”119 While “decision sweeping” is hard to
measure quantitatively, anecdotal evidence is not difficult to find,120 and at
least one Supreme Court justice—Justice Thomas in a dissent from the de-
nial of certiorari—has accused a circuit court of using unpublished disposi-
tions to evade review.121
3. Imperfect Proxies
The Court relies on proxies to determine whether a case is worth grant-
ing. Whether there is a split, whether the solicitor general has requested
certiorari, which lawyers or firms are listed as counsel, the number of ami-
cus briefs—all these are facts that the Supreme Court appears to find rele-
vant.122 But these proxies are only indirect markers—not direct measures—
of importance. Presumably the solicitor general only asks the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari if the SG thinks the case is important—but the case
is not important simply because the SG has filed a petition.
115. Id. at 71–72.
116. Id. at 72.
117. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings,
62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1371, 1374 (1995) (“We do occasionally sweep troublesome issues under
the rug, though most will not stay put for long.”). Judge Richard Arnold agrees. Richard S.
Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 219, 223 (1999) (“[I]f,
after hearing argument, a judge in conference thinks that a certain decision should be reached,
but also believes that the decision is hard to justify under the law, he or she can achieve the
result, assuming agreement by the other members of the panel, by deciding the case in an
unpublished opinion and sweeping the difficulties under the rug.”).
118. David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over Un-
published Opinions, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1667, 1680 (2005) (“The widespread use of un-
published, nonprecedential opinions provides incentives to appellate judges to insulate from
en banc and Supreme Court review decisions that are controversial, unpopular, deviate from
or even conflict with circuit precedent, or are inconsistent with the judge’s ideological
views.”).
119. Id. at 1684.
120. See id. at 1685–89 (cataloging cases in which judges “intentionally cho[se] to duck
some inconvenient issues”).
121. See Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828, 831 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (“It is hard to imagine a reason that the Court of Appeals would not have pub-
lished this opinion except to avoid creating binding law for the Circuit.”).
122. See supra Section I.A.
724 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:705
With respect to splits in particular—probably the most important factor
in granting certiorari—whether lower courts disagree on a particular legal
issue is an especially imperfect proxy for importance. Perhaps the strongest
argument for the emphasis on splits is premised on the view that uniformity
of federal law is an important goal. A split means that federal law, for all
practical purposes, has ceased to be uniform in some respect throughout the
United States. To the extent that nonuniformity is an evil to be avoided, then
resolving splits serves important social goals. Yet as Amanda Frost has ar-
gued, the common wisdom may significantly overvalue uniformity: “At least
in some categories of cases, judicial disagreements over the meaning of fed-
eral law have few, if any, negative consequences.”123 Frost argues that there is
reason to doubt that the mere existence of a disagreement on a legal ques-
tion between different circuits will significantly impair the law’s legitimacy
or its predictability; nor will such a conflict necessarily place an intolerable
burden on multistate actors.124
We need not resolve whether Frost has the better of this argument,
though. Even those who value uniformity more than Frost must concede
that it is only one goal among many. While ensuring uniformity may be one
part of the Supreme Court’s job, there are other valuable goals case selection
can promote: ensuring that the lower courts are being faithful to the Consti-
tution and Acts of Congress, preventing bad policy results, enforcing limits
on federal interference with state concerns, providing fair process for liti-
gants, ensuring that remedies are available for serious violations of rights,
and so on. Different people will have different views of the Supreme Court’s
job, but few would take the position that resolving splits for the sake of
uniformity is the only purpose of the institution. (If so, why not just use
coin flips to settle the matter whenever a split arises?)125
Justifying the emphasis on splits, then, requires believing that the exis-
tence of a split is a good proxy for whether the issue implicates other impor-
tant values. Perhaps the most important legal issues are the most difficult
ones, and thus the ones most likely to engender conflict in the lower courts.
Or, perhaps, given the Court’s current focus on splits, circuit court judges
will be more inclined to create splits—and to increase the risk that the Su-
preme Court will reverse their decisions—if the issue is one that really mat-
ters. Or perhaps the issues that arise most frequently in the lower courts are
those most likely to produce splits, simply because there are more opportu-
nities for splits to arise.
The problem with this rationale, however, is that the correlation be-
tween conflict and importance seems weak. Often, splits regarding a particu-
lar statute arise because the statute is badly drafted—not because cases
123. Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567, 1570 (2008).
124. See id. at 1584–601.
125. See Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122
Yale L.J. 422, 427 (2012) (“If the Justices were so inclined, they could decide cases by coin flip
instead of by briefing and oral argument. . . . If the Justices approached their decisions in this
way, they would totally eliminate the bottleneck at the top of the American judiciary.”).
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involving that statute are particularly important. To take one example, the
Court has had to deal with numerous cases over recent years involving the
meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA),126 a federal criminal
statute that imposes mandatory minimum sentences for certain repeat of-
fenders. While the ACCA’s applicability is of enormous importance to the
defendant in a particular case, there is no reason to think that the ACCA is
much more important than any other particular legal niche to which the
Court could have devoted the countless hours it has spent parsing the stat-
ute. Nonetheless, splits are the currency of the certiorari process, and the
ACCA seems to have been particularly effective at creating splits.127
Splits can also arise over where the law is particularly technical or com-
plex. Consider a case argued at the Supreme Court in October Term 2016. In
Manrique v. United States, the Court considered “[w]hether a notice of ap-
peal filed after a district court announces its sentence, but before it amends
this sentence to specify a restitution amount, automatically matures to per-
fect an appeal of the amended judgment.”128 While this issue created an
apparently significant circuit split,129 and while the legal issue appears to be
genuinely difficult (indeed, the justices took more than six months before
issuing an opinion over a dissent from Justice Ginsburg),130 one wonders
whether the resolution of this question was really a matter of pressing na-
tional importance. (Notably, the case attracted zero amici,131 which indi-
rectly demonstrates its apparent lack of national importance.) How many
people will the Court’s ruling on this question actually benefit?132 It is hard
to say, but the Supreme Court’s emphasis on splits short-circuits the need to
even ask this question.
Even if we are right that some splits are not particularly important, it
could still be true that most important issues involve splits. The thinking
126. Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012); e.g., Sykes v. United States,
564 U.S. 1 (2011); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009).
127. The ACCA will be somewhat less prone to creating splits going forward; in 2015, the
Court declared that the ACCA’s “residual clause”—which had been the source of some, but
not all, of the Court’s granted ACCA cases—was unconstitutionally vague. Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). For a thorough analysis of the implications of the Johnson
decision, see Leah M. Litman, Resentencing in the Shadow of Johnson v. United States, 28 Fed.
Sent’g Rep. 45f (2015), and Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications of
Johnson’s Potential Ruling on ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 55
(2015), http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Litman.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RF3L-S92D].
128. Brief of Petitioner at i, Manrique v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1266 (2017) (No. 15-
7250).
129. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13–18, Manrique, 137 S. Ct. 1266 (No. 15-7250).
130. See Manrique, 137 S. Ct. 1266.
131. See Manrique v. United States, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/
cases/manrique-v-united-states/ [http://perma.cc/YRH4-J4ET].
132. To be sure, having a settled rule on this question is necessary so that litigants can
know how to perfect their appeals, but there is little reason to think that a national rule—as
opposed to circuit-specific rules, which would persist in the absence of Supreme Court resolu-
tion—is really all that necessary.
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would go as follows: on close issues of real importance with strong argu-
ments on both sides, at least one circuit court will be willing to break with
the pack and create a split; only where the answer to a legal question is easy
will no splits arise. But here, too, there is reason for skepticism. The problem
is that with respect to some issues, the circuit courts could coalesce around a
position that is incorrect—at least insofar as correctness is defined as how
the Supreme Court would decide the issue if confronted with it.
Consider two related examples. In 1987, the Court decided McNally v.
United States and concluded that the federal mail fraud statute does not
extend to schemes to deprive others of intangible rights, “such as the right to
have public officials perform their duties honestly.”133 In so holding, the
Supreme Court rejected the approach that had been taken by every single
court of appeals over a period of decades.134 The issue in McNally was of
significant importance—whether the mail fraud statute extended as far as
the government argued had significant implications for the power of federal
prosecutors to regulate state government officials and various forms of pri-
vate malfeasance. Yet the issue took decades to reach the Court because no
split arose.135
Amazingly, this problem repeated itself: in the wake of McNally, Con-
gress enacted a new statute confirming that the mail fraud statute extended
to schemes involving deprivations of “the intangible right of honest ser-
vices.”136 Over the next two decades, the lower courts upheld various convic-
tions under this statute, often approving broad theories of criminal liability
similar to those that had proliferated in the lower courts before McNally.137
Although the lower courts did not seem to consistently agree in their ap-
proaches, clear splits were slow to emerge. Finally, in 2009, the Court
(largely through the persistence of Justice Scalia)138 got interested in the is-
sue. The decision that ultimately emerged, Skilling v. United States, pared
§ 1346 down far beyond what any of the lower courts had done, to apply to
only bribes and kickbacks.139 While the circuit courts had disagreed on the
meaning of § 1346, none had concluded that it covered only bribes and
133. 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987).
134. McNally, 483 U.S. at 358.
135. See id. at 362–64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Hasner, 340 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that
public officials commit honest-services fraud when they take official action without disclosing
a conflict of interest); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 363–69 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding
convictions of defendants on theory that they schemed to deprive the University of Tennessee
of the honest services of its employees by helping students to receive advanced degrees through
plagiarism).
138. In 2009, Justice Scalia wrote a dissent from denial of certiorari that pointed out the
breadth of the lower court case law. See Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204, 1205–06 (2009)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Several months later, the Court agreed to hear
several cases about the scope of honest-services fraud. E.g., Skilling v. United States, 558 U.S.
945 (2009).
139. 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010).
March 2018] The Lottery Docket 727
kickbacks and nothing else. Twice, then, with respect to basically the same
issue, the lower courts and the Supreme Court significantly disagreed on the
meaning of an important legal provision. And while the Court did eventu-
ally resolve the issue, nearly two decades elapsed between McNally and
Skilling.
This problem is not isolated. Not infrequently, the Supreme Court re-
solves an important legal issue in a way that differs from the consensus in
the lower courts. Consider Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.140 There, the
plaintiffs were former residents of Nigeria who alleged that the defendants,
several foreign corporations, violated international law by aiding and abet-
ting the Nigerian government in atrocities committed in retaliation for envi-
ronmental protests.141 The Court granted certiorari to resolve whether
corporations could be sued under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),142 an issue
on which the circuit courts had divided.143 Yet when the Court examined the
case closely, it zeroed in on a different legal issue. After oral argument, the
Court requested additional briefing and argument on whether the ATS “al-
lows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”144
The Court subsequently answered that question in the negative.145
In doing so, the Court rejected the views of the lower courts, which had
uniformly held or assumed that the ATS could apply extraterritorially.146
Had the split on the corporate liability issue—an orthogonal question—not
arisen, one wonders when or how the Court might have confronted the ex-
traterritoriality problem that all the lower courts had missed or ignored.
And then one must wonder how many other similar issues are out there—
legal questions on which the Supreme Court would disagree with the con-
sensus approach in the lower courts, but which the Court never even notices
unless they happen to come up in cases granted to resolve other circuit
splits.
Of course, if the Court almost always agreed with circuit court consen-
sus, this problem would seem more theoretical than real. But in fact, the
Court regularly disagrees with the common wisdom in the lower courts.
Aaron-Andrew Bruhl’s recent study of “lopsided” splits (those with several
more circuits on one side of the issue) during October Terms 2010–2012
concluded that the Court sided with the majority view in thirteen of twenty-
140. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
141. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63.
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
143. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 18–21, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
144. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 565 U.S. 1244 (2012) (ordering reargument on
this issue).
145. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
146. See Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance at 10 & n.2, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
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one (or 62%) of cases.147 Certainly, these statistics show that the Court often
agrees with lower court consensus—but also that rejecting that consensus is
not particularly unusual either. (Indeed, as Bruhl put it, “[P]erhaps the
headline is that the Court disagrees with lopsided lower-court majorities so
often.”)148 In fact, in addition to Kiobel, the study identified three other cases
where the Court took a position that no circuit court had adopted.149 More-
over, these statistics almost certainly undercount the number of cases where
the Court rejected a lower court consensus because the study limited its
count to cases where the Court itself described the state of lower court juris-
prudence in its opinion.150 If it is not particularly rare for the Court to take a
position that most circuit courts have rejected—or even that no circuit court
has adopted—then it is at least plausible that there are a number situations
where the Court might do the same if it had occasion to resolve the issue.
Yet those occasions might never arise in a world where splits are certio-
rari’s main currency. The problem is that, even with respect to unquestiona-
bly important issues, herding behavior is likely to prevent splits from arising;
circuit courts often follow each other, rather than independently evaluating
the arguments. Where, say, five circuits have interpreted a statute one way,
the sixth to confront the statute may be particularly hesitant to go the other
direction.151 This may be because the judges on the panel assume the other
circuits interpreted the statute correctly, or because they secretly disagree
but do not want to risk the embarrassment of reversal (knowing that splits
make Supreme Court review more likely). Regardless of the reason, the ef-
fect is the same: a cascade that can result in a circuit consensus that the
Supreme Court, if it had the opportunity to resolve the question, would
reject.
Beyond the problem of cascades, splitless-but-erroneous circuit court
rulings can also result from specialized venue rules and even from the sub-
stantive law itself. Consider petitions to review regulations promulgated by
administrative agencies. When an agency regulation is challenged in multi-
ple circuits, the cases are consolidated in one court, selected at random from
among those with a pending petition.152 By definition, no circuit split can
thereafter emerge (at least at the pre-enforcement stage) on the lawfulness of
147. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 851,
901 (2014).
148. Id. at 903.
149. See id. at 901.
150. See id. at 904–09 (describing the study’s methodology). Indeed, looking “beyond the
four corners of the opinions,” the author himself identified other examples where the Court
took a position no circuit court had adopted. See id. at 906–07.
151. Scott Baker and Anup Malani have shown that, as each additional circuit reaches the
same conclusion as to a disputed legal issue, the next circuit to confront that legal question
becomes more likely to follow the pack. See Scott Baker & Anup Malani, How Do Judges Learn
from Precedent? 22 tbl.6 (Nov. 18, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.colum
bia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites /law-economics-studies/20151118_how_do_judges_learn_
from_precedentbakermalani.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V8S-YVU6].
152. 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3) (2012).
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the regulation.153 Similarly, when the substantive law governing a topic is
infused by standards, rather than rules, circuit splits are unlikely.154 Rule 10
makes clear that at the certiorari stage, the Court cares much more about
how the lower court defines the governing standard, not how the court ap-
plies that standard to the facts of a case.155 Carolyn Shapiro argues that this
explains the Supreme Court’s lack of useful guidance on employment dis-
crimination.156 Likewise, when a law applies to a geographically limited area
(i.e., when its application is confined within a single federal circuit), no
splits will appear.157 Matthew Fletcher argues that many claims brought by
American Indian tribes fall into this category, and that they are accordingly
underrepresented on the Supreme Court’s docket.158
The central problem, as we see it, is that the heavy focus on splits means
that the Supreme Court may never even realize when its help is most
needed. If, for example, the lower courts have reached consensus on an in-
correct interpretation of law, the Court will likely only ever confront the
issue if it comes up indirectly in a case implicating some other split.159 Or if
there is widespread confusion about how to apply a settled legal standard to
given facts, it is rare for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and provide
guidance—no matter how much that guidance might be needed. “Neither
the Court’s culture nor its certiorari criteria encourage a law clerk to say,
‘although all the lower courts agree on the appropriate standard for this area
of law, the application of that standard is so inconsistent that Supreme
Court involvement is warranted.’ ”160 In short, the Court’s current practices
ensure that it never seriously evaluates a wide range of splitless legal issues,
even though those legal issues might be of significant importance.
C. Previous Proposals for Reform
Just as we are not the first to identify pathologies in the certiorari pro-
cess,161 we aren’t the first to suggest an institutional reform. In fact, such
proposals have proliferated in recent years.162 Paul Carrington and Roger
153. See William Ortman, Rulemaking’s Missing Tier, 68 Ala. L. Rev. 225, 255–56 (2016).
154. See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 273–74.
155. See Sup. Ct. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated
rule of law.”); see also Shapiro, supra note 6, at 289.
156. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 296.
157. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier to
Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 933, 957 (2009) (noting that circuit splits are rare in
Indian law cases because the only possible split is usually between a state court and a federal
circuit).
158. Id. at 956–57.
159. See cases discussed supra notes 133–146 and accompanying text.
160. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 285.
161. See supra Section I.B.
162. Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1, 20 (2011) (“In order to address some of the perceived problems with the Court’s
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Cramton, for example, suggest creating a “certiorari division” composed of
non–Supreme Court Article III judges to select cases for the Court’s
docket.163 Amanda Tyler argues for bringing back the “certification” process,
whereby federal circuit courts could certify legal questions to the Supreme
Court.164 Tracey George and Chris Guthrie urge Congress to redesign the
Supreme Court to make it work more like the U.S. courts of appeals, with
more justices, decisions heard by panels, and an en banc procedure.165 Rich-
ard Lazarus suggests adding senior lawyers to the Court’s staff to assist the
justices and their clerks with case selection.166
But not all observers agree that tinkering with the Supreme Court’s
docket is called for. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III of the Fourth Circuit has
suggested that the critics are offering solutions in search of a problem.167
There is no reason to think the Court needs more work, he contends, and
moreover, “the world will not end because a few circuit splits are left un-
resolved.”168 More fundamentally, Judge Wilkinson challenges the very co-
herence of the argument that the Supreme Court routinely errs in how it
selects cases. “[I]f we cannot trust the Supreme Court’s judgment in decid-
ing what to decide,” he asks, “how can we trust its judgment in deciding
what it has decided to decide?”169
In this debate, we stand firmly with the reformers. Even someone who
genuinely believes that the Court wisely decides cases on the merits can
question current certiorari practices without contradiction. The Court’s ap-
proach to certiorari reflects a number of trade-offs. In its heavy reliance on
imperfect proxies, the Court appears to have concluded that the justices’
limited time and attentions are best spent on the merits cases, not on
gatekeeping. That may be an understandable compromise in light of the
potentially unmanageable time commitment that full attention to the certio-
rari docket would require. But it does not prove that there are no ways that
the Court’s case-selection procedures could be improved—especially if there
are available methods for improvement that do not impose significant addi-
tional time constraints on the justices. And the proposals outlined above,
current certiorari practices, numerous proposals for reform have been floated in the past few
years alone.”).
163. Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the
Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 587, 630–36 (2009).
164. Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for Certifica-
tion?, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1310, 1319–26 (2010). Craig Lerner and Nelson Lund go further,
proposing a statute that would limit the number of certiorari cases on the Court’s docket to
the number of cases certified by the circuit courts. Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial
Duty and the Supreme Court’s Cult of Celebrity, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1255, 1289 (2010).
165. See George & Guthrie, supra note 99, at 1442.
166. Lazarus, supra note 7, at 97.
167. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, If It Ain’t Broke . . ., 119 Yale L.J. Online 67, 67–68 (2010),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/840_egpccc2c.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGM8-PASM].
168. Id. at 69.
169. Id. at 75.
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and others like them,170 at least have potential to serve as such
improvements.
At the same time, however, we think the prior proposed reforms have all
missed something significant. None of the proposals sufficiently addresses
the biggest problems we see with the Court’s case-selection process. Nearly
all the proposals on the table accept—or are at least agnostic about—the
idea that only truly important cases merit the Supreme Court’s attention.171
They focus instead on repairing flaws in the mechanisms used to identify
and select such cases.172 But that is not enough. The pathologies of the certi-
orari docket that we have described would exist even in a world where the
Court was able to devote ten times as many hours ensuring it was following
Rule 10 to the letter. We think the problem lies in the very premise that the
Court should be trying to identify all, and only, the truly important cases to
resolve on the merits. Our proposal, to which the next Part turns, rejects
that premise—and thus could hold the key to solving the certiorari docket’s
major difficulties.
II. The Lottery Docket
This Part offers our proposal to improve the Supreme Court’s case-se-
lection process: the lottery docket. Section II.A sketches the outlines of the
proposal, while bracketing the finer details as well as some practical con-
cerns about implementation. Section II.B explains how the lottery docket
would ameliorate the pathologies of the current certiorari process. Section
II.C responds to several objections.
170. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 6, at 85–86 (considering possibility that litigants could
provide more information about the “frequency and nature of litigation below”); Watts, supra
note 162, at 42–68 (proposing incorporating administrative law principles).
171. To be sure, we are far from the first to suggest problems with this idea. See, e.g.,
Schauer, supra note 6, at 83–85; Shapiro, supra note 69, at 127. Only one of the recent institu-
tional proposals, however, portends significant reform in this dimension. Tracey George and
Chris Guthrie propose expanding the size of the Supreme Court to fifteen justices who would
sit in panels. George & Guthrie, supra note 99, at 1475. They argue that this would, among
other things, generate a more credible threat of review of circuit decisions and facilitate judi-
cial learning at the Supreme Court level. Id. at 1469–81. George and Guthrie’s innovative
proposal would achieve some of the same benefits as our proposal, but—given its total rede-
sign of the Supreme Court—at a substantially higher cost. Our proposal would be far easier to
implement.
172. Lerner and Lund buck this trend by proposing “to reintroduce circuit riding into the
life of the Supreme Court.” Lerner & Lund, supra note 164, at 1295. Requiring justices to sit
each year as circuit or district judges, Lerner and Lund argue, would force them to “cope with
many of the bread-and-butter issues that other federal judges confront daily.” Id. at 1299. We
agree with Lerner and Lund that circuit riding would convey useful information to the justices
about the quotidian work of the lower courts. Circuit riding would not, however, address the
other pathologies at which the lottery docket is aimed. It would not force the Court, as an
institution, to confront ordinary cases, and so would not improve decisionmaking at the circuit
level. Nor would it be likely to help the Justices find the “missing cases” that evade certiorari.
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A. The Proposal
Our proposal is a simple one. We propose supplementing the Supreme
Court’s certiorari docket by giving the Court appellate jurisdiction over a
new set of cases. These cases would be selected from the final decisions of
the circuit courts173 and entered into the lottery. At regular intervals—for
sake of argument, say four times a year—a small number of cases would be
chosen as “winners.” Once chosen, the losing party in the lower court would
be granted the right to appeal.174 The appeal would then proceed much like
any other case in which the Supreme Court exercises mandatory appellate
jurisdiction after probable jurisdiction is noted. The appellant would file an
opening brief, the appellee a response brief, and so it would proceed.175 Nor-
mal rules of forfeiture and waiver would apply, but otherwise the appellant
could make any argument properly preserved in the court below. The Su-
preme Court, in turn, would be obliged to rule on the merits of the dis-
pute—just as a circuit court panel would. Just like any other decision of the
Supreme Court on the merits, the decision would be precedential.176
Described at this high level of abstraction, the reader is likely left with
many questions. First, how could the proposal be implemented in the first
place, and who could do it? One simple way would be for the Supreme
Court to do so itself using its certiorari jurisdiction. It could simply decide
to start granting a set number of certiorari petitions based on a randomized
process rather than based on a detailed review of the substantive arguments.
Given the unfettered discretion the Court possesses to dispose of certiorari
petitions, there is no reason why it should lack the power to pick some
petitions to grant through a random process.
This solution, though, is not ideal; one of the benefits of the lottery
docket would be the way it would expose the Court to a more representative
sample of cases in the lower courts. If eligible cases were limited to those in
which petitions for certiorari were filed, that would reduce the proposal’s
ability to ameliorate the distortion. Perhaps the Court could address this
173. We consider later whether this proposal could extend to decisions from state courts.
See infra Section III.C.
174. Where the lower court decision goes against both parties in different respects, each
party could have the right to cross-appeal, as often occurs with appeals to the circuit courts
from district court rulings.
175. Briefing on the merits for cases set for argument—whether from the appellate docket
or the certiorari docket—is governed by Supreme Court Rules 24 and 25. Sup. Ct. R. 24–25.
176. Of course, how much precedential weight such a decision deserves is an open ques-
tion. The Court has made clear that summary affirmances—as decisions on the merits of an
appeal—are precedential decisions, though ones that are entitled to somewhat less weight than
decisions with opinions. A summary affirmance “thus has ‘considerably less precedential value
than an opinion on the merits.’ ” Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct.
1787, 1800 (2015) (quoting Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
180–81 (1979)). Our hope is that the Court would not merely summarily affirm, but would
hear argument and write an opinion addressing the issues in depth. If so, we would also hope
that the opinion would be entitled to just as much precedential weight as any other Supreme
Court opinion.
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problem by amending its rules to authorize a new form of certiorari peti-
tion. Rather than filing a lengthy, professionally printed, booklet-bound pe-
tition and pay a $300 fee, as currently required,177 the Court could permit
lottery entrants to file a simple, one-page document declaring the peti-
tioner’s intent to enter the lottery.178
Perhaps a simpler way, though, would be for Congress to add a new
class of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction by statute. Congress could,
perhaps, amend 28 U.S.C. § 1254. That section currently provides that
“[c]ases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court”179
using certiorari or certification; it would be simple enough to add a new
subsection laying out the terms of the lottery proposal. Once a court of
appeals denied an en banc petition, or the time for filing that petition ex-
pired, the case would become eligible for the lottery. The case would then
either automatically be entered into the lottery or be entered upon filing a
document like a notice of appeal; we address this complexity later.180
A second question concerns how many lottery-docket cases the Court
should hear each year. Our view is that the Court should hear enough new
cases so as to meaningfully increase the likelihood that the Court will be
exposed to a wide range of issues, at least over a multiyear period—but not
so many new cases that the Court feels overwhelmed by the influx. Avoiding
that latter risk is especially important: there is a danger that the Court could
start to treat its mandatory appellate jurisdiction over the lottery cases as if
they were part of its certiorari jurisdiction. That is, the concern is that the
Court would simply issue summary affirmances without seriously evaluating
the merits.181 Although one would hope that the precedential nature of an
affirmance (unlike a certiorari denial) would provide some safeguard against
such cavalier use of summary disposition, it is no guarantee. In the past,
when the Court has been overwhelmed by its appellate docket, it has proven
willing to use summary tools to dispose of cases even where more careful
treatment would have been appropriate.182
177. See Sup. Ct. R. 33.1 (requiring booklet format for petitions for certiorari, among
other filings); Sup. Ct. R. 38(a) (setting out fee “for docketing a case on a petition for a writ of
certiorari”). Booklet format and filing fees are not required for in forma pauperis petitioners.
See Sup. Ct. R. 39.3 (noting that in forma pauperis petitioners may generally file documents
under Rule 33.2, which governs plain-paper format filing); Sup. Ct. R. 39.4 (stating that docu-
ments properly filed by a party proceeding in forma pauperis “will be placed on the docket
without the payment of a docket fee or any other fee”).
178. The Supreme Court has the authority to set its own fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1911 (2012),
and so we see no reason why the Court could not state by Rule that parties could enter the
lottery without paying any filing fee.
179. Id. § 1254.
180. See infra Section III.A.
181. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
182. See Linzer, supra note 31, at 1293 (“[O]n a number of occasions the Court, without
comment, has summarily disposed of appeals raising issues that certainly were unclear under
the existing case law.”).
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While we do not have an exact number in mind, in our view perhaps
twenty to forty lottery cases each year would strike the right balance between
competing considerations. That number would be few enough that the
Court could, if it were willing, give each case full-dress treatment, with an
hour-long oral argument and detailed discussion at conference. Many more
than that, and it becomes likelier that the Court would cut corners on the
lottery cases so as to have more time to focus on the certiorari docket. But
given that the Court seemed able, as recently as the 1980s, to hear more than
150 cases a year,183 we think adding a few dozen to the current caseload of
seventy to eighty would impose no great burden.
It is also possible that the Court would reduce the number of certiorari
petitions granted to compensate for the new lottery cases, in which case the
lottery docket would impose no additional time constraints. One might ask
whether a reduction in the certiorari docket would be a social cost. But given
our skepticism about the correlation between splits and importance, we do
not think it is likely that this cost is significant. That is especially the case
given that the most important splits—ones that recur on a regular basis—
will by their nature arise again and again, giving the Court more opportuni-
ties to resolve them.
Without question, however, the success of this proposal depends on the
willingness of the Court to play along. Simply giving the Court jurisdiction
over a new set of cases is inadequate to guarantee that the Court will take
those cases seriously. And it is critical that the Court take the lottery docket
seriously: if the justices just go through the motions and pay little attention
to the merits of the cases so that they can focus on the hot-button constitu-
tional cases instead, the proposal is unlikely to do much good. (One troub-
ling scenario is that the Court might just summarily affirm all the cases on
its lottery docket. A potentially worse scenario would occur if the Court
distorted justiciability doctrines to rid itself of unwanted lottery cases.) For
this reason, getting some buy-in from the Court, or even getting the Court
to adopt the proposal itself, rather than foisting it on the justices unwillingly,
is absolutely critical for its success.
Why might the Court agree to the lottery docket? In our view, its bene-
fits—which we describe in detail below—are all benefits that the Court itself
should desire. The justices want to know what is happening in the lower
courts, they do not want the lower courts to ignore their precedents, and
they want to settle important questions. If the Court were convinced that the
lottery docket would lead to these benefits, without imposing too many costs
on the Court’s ability to deal with the certiorari docket, we think the justices
could very well embrace the proposal—or at least tolerate it if nothing else.
183. See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking
Docket, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1219, 1229 fig.1 (2012).
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B. Benefits
Supplementing the Court’s certiorari docket with a lottery docket
would, particularly in the long run, counteract the informational, accounta-
bility, and missing-cases pathologies of certiorari described above. While it
would not correct them entirely, we proceed on the premise that incremen-
tal change is worthwhile. The perfect must not be the enemy of the good.184
1. Better Information
The lottery would expose the Court to cases that quite simply it would
otherwise never see. The Court would have to decide the issues the cases
presented, regardless of whether the issue is important or trivial. The Court
would be confronted with summary judgment appeals, run-of-the-mill evi-
dentiary disputes, sufficiency challenges to criminal convictions, motions to
reduce damages awards, and everything else in between. Many of these is-
sues are ones that the Court would have no interest in confronting if limited
to its certiorari jurisdiction.
Over time, this would expose the Supreme Court justices to a wider
spectrum of federal litigation. Because the lottery docket would be more
representative of the workload of the circuit courts,185 deciding these cases
would educate the Court about the types and distribution of disputes that
occupy the federal courts—at least at the circuit level186—yielding more of
the kinds of information that is needed for crafting effective rules.
Randomization is an oft-used tool of information acquisition, especially
in the sciences.187 This is in part because, as Adam Samaha observes, random
samples from a population of interest “can be studied at lower cost than can
the entire population.”188 It is impossible for the Supreme Court to review a
significant percentage of circuit decisions.189 Nonetheless, because the cir-
cuits’ caseload contains type and distribution information useful to Su-
preme Court lawmaking, the universe of cases decided by federal courts is—
or should be—a population of interest to the Supreme Court. Examining a
random sample of those cases would give the Court otherwise impossible-
to-access information about the full population. To be sure, many lottery-
docket cases would not be independently significant to anyone other than
the litigants. Their informational value would not be in creating precedent
184. Cf. Voltaire, La Begueule, in 3 Recueil Des Meilleurs Contes En Vers 77, 77
(London, n. pub. 1778) (“[L]e mieux est ennemi du bien . . . .”).
185. Just how closely depends on lottery mechanics we discuss infra in Sections
III.A–III.B.
186. Below, we explore how the lottery mechanism could be deployed so that the docket
resembles the workload of district courts. See infra Section III.B.
187. See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1,
23–24 (2009).
188. Id. at 23.
189. See Posner, supra note 106, at 14 n.22.
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directly, but in helping the Court craft good law when legally important
questions do reach it for decision.
We recognize, of course, that the proposal we have offered is insufficient
to eradicate the Court’s information deficit completely. Adding several
dozen lottery-docket cases to the Court’s caseload is certainly not enough to
give the Court a complete sense of federal litigation generally. And even if
the Court could hear enough lottery cases to have a fully representative sam-
ple of what is happening in the circuit courts, that would not fully inform
the Court of what is going on in the district courts, since not all adverse
district court rulings are appealed.190
Nor would a representative docket give the Court all of the critical infor-
mation it needs. Choosing an appropriate legal rule, at least if one’s method-
ology is sensitive to consequentialist considerations, requires a sense of how
many people that rule will benefit, how many people it will harm, and the
magnitudes of the costs and benefits.191 Case-by-case adjudication is simply
not the optimal procedure for producing that kind of information.192 All this
said, however, exposing the Court to a wider swath of cases would unques-
tionably give it more information from which to make decisions, even if it
would not give the Court perfect information. And reducing the Court’s
information deficit strikes us as an important goal even if eliminating that
deficit is impossible.
2. Tighter Accountability
The lottery docket would also counteract certiorari’s accountability gap.
As described above, because of the all-certiorari docket, circuit judges often
know that they are a case’s last stop, weakening the accountability of circuit
judges for their rulings.193 Not so with a lottery docket in place. Every case,
no matter how seemingly quotidian, would be a candidate for review. The
chance that a particular case will “win the lottery” would, of course, be
small, given the inevitable chasm between the number of cases the circuits
decide and the size of any plausible lottery docket. But—unlike in the cur-
rent system—no case would be categorically exempt from review.194
190. One way to address this particular problem is through a weighted lottery, which we
consider infra in Section III.B.
191. See Schauer, supra note 85, at 893–94 (“Any rulemaker . . . is explicitly or implicitly
engaged in a process of surveying the future and imagining the field of decisions to be gov-
erned by the putative rule. . . . [A] necessary component of any rulemaking is the process of
trying to get a sense . . . of what the array of future acts, events, disputes, and decisionmaking
occasions will look like.”).
192. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A
Model of Decentralized Law, 14 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 215, 227 (1994) (“The application of
cost-benefit techniques requires more information about cost than courts usually possess.”).
193. See supra Section I.B.2.
194. The accountability benefit of the lottery docket is an example of a downstream incen-
tive effect of randomized decisionmaking. See generally Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements:
Studies in the Limitations of Rationality 68–69 (1989).
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The effectiveness of an accountability regime is a function of the
probability that an agent will be sanctioned for poor performance and the
seriousness of the sanction.195 There is some reason to think that lottery-
docket reversals would be more costly to circuit judges (and thus a more
serious sanction) than reversals in cases decided on certiorari. Much evi-
dence suggests that circuit judges do not mind being reversed on certiorari.
As Richard Posner explains, “aversion to reversal” is “fairly unimportant” to
circuit judges in part because “most [reversals] reflect differences in judicial
philosophy or legal policy rather than mistake or incompetence by the ap-
pellate judges.”196 An anonymous circuit judge interviewed by political
scientists Jennifer Bowie and Donald Songer agreed: “If they do review and
they see it differently, so be it—it is their job after all to make law.”197 Bowie
and Songer’s quantitative analysis of circuit court decisionmaking further
corroborates that fear of reversal does not significantly motivate circuit
court decisionmaking.198
The perception by circuit judges that reversal is not embarrassing may
be exacerbated by the fact that most cases that the Supreme Court decides
are extremely close questions. Indeed, the fact that reasonable minds can
disagree on a legal question is often the reason why the case creates a split
that gets the Supreme Court’s attention. If, by contrast, the Supreme Court
reverses the lower court for committing an elementary error, the reputa-
tional costs of reversal may be higher.199
Thus, we suspect that the circuit judges’ calculus might be different
under a lottery docket. Being reversed in a case that reached the Supreme
Court by lottery would ordinarily not mean that the justices merely made
different value judgments than the panel below, or that they came up with a
different answer to an extremely close legal question that divided the lower
courts. It could instead indicate that the circuit court was sloppy or careless
in its analysis of the case. That would be embarrassing in a way that certio-
rari reversals are not.200 As Bowie and Songer’s anonymous judge told them,
“[T]he only thing that would embarrass me to my colleagues is if I hadn’t
done a good job—if my analysis were sloppy or if I had missed an important
case.”201 That lottery-docket reversals would impose reputational costs for
195. Cf. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ.
169, 176–79 (1968).
196. Posner, supra note 106, at 14–15.
197. Bowie & Songer, supra note 105, at 405.
198. Id. at 398–403.
199. Although we are unaware of any research on this question, it may be that circuit
judges are more sensitive to being summarily reversed than to being reversed after briefing and
oral argument. Unlike an ordinary reversal, summary reversals are usually reserved for situa-
tions where the lower court makes an error as to clearly settled law.
200. See Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1627 (2000)
(noting that random selection of panel decisions for en banc review “might lead judges to take
more care with routine cases, since it would be embarrassing to be reversed on one, particu-
larly if the panel’s treatment of the issues was cursory”).
201. Bowie & Songer, supra note 105, at 405.
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circuit judges is—obviously and necessarily—only a hypothesis, but it finds
support in empirical analysis by Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner
suggesting that district courts are influenced by the threat of reversal.202 Why
this difference between district and circuit judges? We suspect that, in part,
it is because district judges cannot shrug off reversals as the product of dif-
ferent value judgments or reasonable disagreement on a particularly thorny
legal issue.
To be sure, even with a lottery docket, the chance that a sloppy circuit
court decision would be reversed will remain far lower than the chance that
a sloppy district court decision would be reversed. But here, it is compara-
tive, not absolute, judgments that matter. Reversal is the Supreme Court’s
only tool to maintain the accountability of lower court judges, and the cur-
rent regime makes it irrelevant for most cases. For many cases, the
probability of reversal is effectively zero. Under our proposal, the probability
of reversal, while still small, is greater than zero for all cases—and that is an
improvement from the status quo.
3. More of the Important Issues
Thus far, we have argued that the lottery docket would bring the Court
some seemingly unimportant cases in the hopes of producing better sys-
temic results. But we do not mean to suggest that every lottery-docket case
would be unimportant in its own right. Indeed, one benefit of the proposal
is that it could actually bring important cases before the Court that the
Court would otherwise never see.
As argued above,203 the proxies on which the Court relies in the certio-
rari process are—like all proxies—imperfect. And so there are likely some
important issues that it would be helpful for the Supreme Court to decide
but that never appear on the Court’s radar. One principal aspect of the
problem is that there are issues where the lower courts coalesce around one
view without creating a split—but if the Supreme Court were to confront
the issue, it might decide the case differently. Indeed, above we pointed to
examples where issues took many years to reach the Court and where the
Court ultimately rejected the consensus reached by the lower courts.204
Why might this occur? Consider how circuit court decisionmaking
works. Circuit courts have high caseloads and consider issues in groups of
only three judges. Some circuit panels, deciding issues of first impression,
may devote significant time and effort towards getting the answer right. But
sometimes a court may deal with an issue hastily and reach a result that, in
an optimal decisionmaking environment, it might not have reached. As
202. See Stephen Choi et al., What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publica-
tions, Citations, and Reversals, 28 J.L. Econ. & Org. 518, 543 (2012) (finding evidence that
“[d]istrict judges, whatever their political orientation, decide cases in a politically biased way,
albeit reflecting the political biases of the appellate judges rather than those of the district
judges themselves”).
203. See supra Section I.B.3.
204. See supra Section I.B.3.
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noted,205 circuit courts have a tendency to herd: once one decides an issue,
the next circuit to confront the same question is more likely to agree. That
becomes more true as additional circuits join the herd.206 Given time, it is
quite possible for the circuits to reach consensus around the wrong—or
suboptimal—position on a legal issue.
Why, then, might the Supreme Court be more likely to correct such
mistakes? First of all, the Supreme Court does not seem subject to the herd-
ing phenomenon above—the Court does not seem particularly deferential to
the views of lower courts, and not infrequently it sides with the “short” side
of a circuit split.207 But beyond that, the Supreme Court has a number of
institutional advantages that make it more likely, as compared to the circuit
courts, to reach the right answers to hard legal questions. Of course, in a
trivial sense, all of its rulings are “correct” because the Court is the final
authority on the meaning of federal law. But in our view, there is a sense in
which the Court is likely to reach better answers to hard legal questions, as
judged by conventional criteria—fidelity to text, “fit” with precedent, logical
consistency, and so on. One does not have to fully embrace Ronald Dwor-
kin’s right-answer thesis208 to believe that—at least judged from the perspec-
tive of the governing norms of our legal system—there are better and worse
answers to some legal questions.
And the Supreme Court is particularly well equipped to reach good an-
swers. As compared to the circuit courts, it has more judges considering
each case (nine209 as compared to three), the average quality of which should
be higher (assuming that justices are more distinguished than the average
circuit judge, and that their distinction correlates with judicial quality);
more time to spend on each case (the Court has a lighter merits caseload
205. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
206. In theory, many minds are more likely to get the right answer. The Condorcet Jury
Theory holds that, if each decisionmaker has a greater than 50% probability of coming to a
right answer, the majority view will be more likely to be correct as you factor in more deci-
sions or votes. Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. Legal Analysis
1, 4–5 (2009). That thesis does not hold, however, when the different decisions are linked—
that is, where the second decisionmaker relies on the first, the third relies on the second, and
so on. Under those circumstances, an “informational cascade” can occur. See Timur Kuran &
Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 720–24
(1999) (describing the general phenomenon of informational cascades).
207. See Bruhl, supra note 147, at 900–03 (describing study that showed that the Court
often disagreed with the majority view of the circuits in “lopsided” splits).
208. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1978) (arguing
that there are often right answers to disputed legal questions).
209. Or eight, as was the case for more than a year due to the death of Justice Scalia and
the Senate’s refusal to vote on President Obama’s nominee, Merrick Garland. Adam Liptak &
Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. Times
(Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-
court.html?mcubz=1 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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than most appellate courts210); more experienced clerks;211 more help from
amici;212 more experienced librarians;213 and so on. These advantages make
the Court well equipped to see where lower courts might have erred and to
correct the errors and thereby improve the law.
But the Court cannot do this if it never gets a chance to confront the
issues. Nor can the Court easily identify such splitless issues where its help
might be needed. After careful study of an issue, with help of good briefing,
amicus briefs, oral argument, and so on, the Court may be confident that
the lower courts have erred. But at the certiorari stage, it is much more
difficult to see that the lower courts have erred. Sometimes a justice will get
invested in an issue and try to get his or her colleagues interested—as seems
to have happened to Justice Scalia with honest-services fraud.214 But many
such cases will inevitably slip through the cracks.
We have no way of knowing how many such issues—where the Court
would disagree with the consensus in the lower courts—currently exist but
lack much hope of ever getting to the Court. Those issues are unquestiona-
bly important, but the Court’s current approach makes it unlikely they will
be reviewed. The lottery system would not immediately identify all such
cases. But it is much likelier that the Court would confront seemingly settled
legal questions and hopefully make sure that any consensus in the lower
courts was actually correct. Thus, to the extent that the certiorari-only
docket ends up leaving out some important cases, the lottery docket would
alleviate that problem.215
210. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges
Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. Legal Analysis 101, 104 (2011) (“On aver-
age a Supreme Court Justice writes only 8 to 10 majority opinions a year, compared to a mean
of 54 for a court of appeals judge.”).
211. Law clerks for Supreme Court justices almost invariably spend a year or more clerk-
ing for other federal judges before arriving at One First Street and sometimes have additional
post–law school work experience. See Harvey Gee, Book Review, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 781,
782–83 (2008) (reviewing Todd C. Peppers, Courtiers of the Marble Palace: The Rise
and Influence of the Supreme Court Law Clerk (2006)).
212. Supreme Court cases—because of their national importance and their high profile—
are much likelier to attract amicus briefs than cases in the circuit courts. See Linda Sandstrom
Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Effi-
ciency, and Adversarialism, 27 Rev. Litig. 669, 686 (2008) (reporting results of a survey of
judges and justices in which justices indicated that more than 50% of the Supreme Court cases
involved amicus participation, while circuit judges reported significantly lower rates of amicus
participation).
213. On the Supreme Court’s library, see Judith A. Gaskell, Supreme Service: The Supreme
Court of the United States Library, 15 Trends L. Libr. Mgmt. & Tech., no. 2, 2004, at 6.
214. As noted earlier, Justice Scalia’s dissent from denial in Sorich v. United States, 555
U.S. 1204 (2009), led to later grants of certiorari which ultimately resulted in significant nar-
rowing of the honest-services fraud statute. See supra Section I.B.3.
215. The lottery docket could perhaps find these missing cases more quickly if winning
lottery tickets were transferrable. A litigant granted lottery-docket review could then sell her
spot on the Court’s docket to the highest bidder, who might, under certain assumptions, be
thought to possess the most important missing case. Of course, transferrable tickets raise
problematic distributional concerns and would also likely negatively impact the lottery
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As a related benefit, the lottery docket might also offset the “capture” of
the Supreme Court’s docket by an elite Supreme Court bar. As Richard Laz-
arus has documented, by the late 2000s, cases in which “expert” advocates
represented the petitioner comprised more than half of the Court’s granted
cases, up from only 5.8% in October Term 1980.216 In Lazarus’s account, this
capture is made possible because law clerks are awed by famous Supreme
Court advocates and because the advocates themselves are savvy about how
to present their petitions in ways that will be appealing to the justices and
their clerks.217 This phenomenon seems driven by the Supreme Court’s reli-
ance on proxies for case importance in the certiorari process. Although it is
hard to create a circuit split out of thin air, an experienced advocate can help
identify conflict or disagreement that a case implicates and frame the peti-
tion in a particularly favorable way.218 In this way, good advocacy can make
the split—already imperfect as a proxy—even less useful as a proxy for the
ultimately meaningful factor: importance.
The implications of the docket-capture phenomenon on the Court’s
docket are significant. Outside of government practice, expert Supreme
Court advocates tend to be concentrated in a particular practice environ-
ment (the elite law firm), representing particular kinds of clients (largely,
big-business interests).219 As Lazarus notes, “What is worrisome is the po-
tential for an undesirable skewing in the content of the Court’s docket.”220
That is, docket capture means that the Court is more likely to hear particular
kinds of cases than others, not because these cases are inherently more im-
portant, but because they are ones for which high-paying clients can afford
to hire elite Supreme Court practitioners. Adopting a lottery docket would
counteract—though not, of course, eliminate—this distortion in the docket,
since there would be no way for elite Supreme Court lawyers to influence the
lottery-selection process through effective advocacy.
Whether the lottery cases would still end up captured by elite advocates
in terms of representation is a different matter. One can imagine that, just as
elite Supreme Court practitioners pounce on cases once certiorari is granted,
the same thing would happen once cases won the lottery. But this form of
capture seems less problematic, since it (unlike certiorari capture) would not
be accompanied by a distortion in the Court’s caseload.
docket’s informational and accountability benefits. Thus we note, but do not endorse, this
extension of the proposal. We are indebted to Will Baude for suggesting it.
216. See Lazarus, supra note 7, at 90.
217. See id. at 93–95.
218. See Lazarus, supra note 82, at 1525.
219. See generally Lazarus, supra note 82.
220. Lazarus, supra note 7, at 90.
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C. Objections
In this Section we consider—and reject—several potential objections to
the lottery docket. First, we show that using a lottery creates no constitu-
tional problems. Second, we explain that the lottery docket is neither unfair
nor a threat to the Court’s legitimacy. Third, we contend that the lottery
docket would not impose serious demands on the Court’s limited resources.
1. Constitutionality
A potential legal objection to the lottery docket might be grounded on a
claim that randomized decisionmaking violates the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Jon Elster notes that, in legal contexts, “ ‘random’ is often
synonymous with ‘whimsical,’ ‘capricious’ and ‘arbitrary.’ ”221 Because it
proscribes arbitrary government action,222 the Due Process Clause poses a
plausible, albeit unavailing, objection to our proposal.223
In some contexts, randomized decisionmaking in adjudicative processes
is forbidden. For example, Justice O’Connor suggested in Ohio Adult Parole
Authority v. Woodard that “a scheme whereby a state official flipped a coin to
determine whether to grant clemency” might violate due process.224 Indeed,
the few judges who have actually used coin flips to decide cases (or even
created the mere appearance that they were doing so)225 have found them-
selves subject to judicial discipline.226
221. Elster, supra note 194, at 102.
222. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83–84
(1978).
223. Another potential legal objection to the lottery docket might be grounded on equal
protection principles. Because losing circuit court litigants who are not selected for the Su-
preme Court lottery are not a protected class, however, rational basis review would apply. See
Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 929, 968 (2011) (“In the
United States, the equal protection justification for tolerating both random experimentation
and random assignment of government benefits is that there is a rational basis for randomiza-
tion; and because there is no discrimination against a protected class, no higher standard than
rational basis review is necessary.”). The rational basis for the lottery docket is explored supra
in Section II.B.
224. 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
225. See, e.g., In re Daniels, 340 So. 2d 301, 307 (La. 1976) (upholding censure of judge
whose improper conduct included giving “the appearance he was deciding the guilt or inno-
cence of defendants upon the toss of a coin” even though “prior to the coin flipping, a deci-
sion of guilt or innocence had already been made by respondent and transmitted by him to his
bailiff”).
226. See, e.g., David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Televi-
sion, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 785, 793 n.63
(1993) (accounting how a New York judge decided the length of a defendant’s criminal sen-
tence using a coin flip and was subsequently forced to leave the bench); see also Elster, supra
note 194, at 98–99 (“By and large, random selection is not allowed at [the legal decisionmak-
ing] stage. When it occurs, it is punished.”); Samaha, supra note 187, at 27 (“For judges,
flipping coins is an easy way to draw misconduct sanctions.”).
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Yet in various other contexts, the use of randomization mechanisms in
adjudication is tolerated. For example, juries are randomly selected groups
of citizens empowered to decide the outcomes of cases.227 And juries are not
unique—in the assignment of cases to district judges and of appeals to cir-
cuit panels, randomization is the norm.228 Such randomization can make all
the difference for a litigant. In, say, a criminal appeal in the Ninth Circuit,
whether the defendant goes free or stays in prison can turn on whether the
randomly assigned panel includes Judges Reinhardt, Pregerson, and War-
dlaw, or instead is composed of Judges O’Scannlain, Bybee, and Kleinfeld.
For the litigant much—perhaps everything—turns on this random
assignment.
Yet none of this randomness has ever been considered constitutionally
significant. Why is that so, when other forms of randomized decisionmaking
are clearly inappropriate? How can it be improper to allow a defendant to go
free based on the result of a coin flip, but perfectly fine to have that decision
turn on factors (judicial assignment) that are themselves randomly selected?
As Adam Samaha has shown, our legal system draws the line between per-
missible and impermissible randomization at the merits: courts may (and
do) use randomization mechanisms for nonmerits decisions, but they may
not use randomized decisionmaking procedures (like coin flips) for resolv-
ing the merits of a dispute.229
The key question, then, is whether selecting cases for review involves a
determination about the merits of a case. If so, a lottery would be unques-
tionably improper. As Andrew Coan has put it, “[W]idely shared judicial
norms . . . make it unthinkable for the Court to decide cases by coin flip.”230
Luckily, though, it seems clear that deciding whether a case deserves review
is not an inquiry into the merits of a case. Indeed, the very existence of
certiorari jurisdiction should settle the point. The Court has unambiguously
227. See Akhil Reed Amar, Lottery Voting: A Thought Experiment, 1995 U. Chi. Legal F.
193, 201 (noting that juries are “a place where we . . . use lotteries to vindicate ideas of political
equality and democratic deliberation”). Amar notes, however, that jury selection does not
operate as a pure lottery because of procedures that protect “the right of defendants to decide
who will be on their jury” such as peremptory challenges. Id.
228. Elster, supra note 194, at 93–94; Samaha, supra note 187, at 47 (“Today the process
of assigning cases to judges is pervaded with lotteries.”). A recent empirical study challenges
the assumptions that panel assignments are perfectly random. See Adam S. Chilton & Marin
K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 101
Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2015).
229. Samaha, supra note 187, at 53 (“[W]e are left with an especially awkward combina-
tion: judges habitually randomize case assignments while they routinely punish merits
randomization.”). Of course, the distinction between merits and nonmerits decisions can be
slippery. Id. at 53–57. Moreover, courts do not necessarily identify due process as the reason to
bar randomized merits decisions. E.g., In re Brown, 662 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. 2003) (sanctioning
judge for deciding custody issue with coin flip, but without mentioning due process). Yet it
seems the most obvious grounding for any constitutional prohibition on randomized adjudi-
cation. Samaha, supra note 187, at 39.
230. Coan, supra note 125, at 427.
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declared that a decision on certiorari is not a decision on a case’s merits.231
Assuming certiorari jurisdiction is constitutional as a general matter,232 it
follows that the Court’s agenda can be set via a nonmerits-decision proce-
dure. Because randomization is permissible for nonmerits decisionmaking, a
due process challenge to the lottery docket should fail.
2. Fairness and Legitimacy
Even if selecting cases by lottery is constitutional and otherwise legal,
that doesn’t mean that it’s a good idea. Might assigning cases by lottery seem
unfair to litigants and thereby harm the Supreme Court’s legitimacy in the
eyes of the public? This objection is a reasonable one, but we find it ulti-
mately unpersuasive.
The problem is that the current system of Supreme Court certiorari re-
view is, from the perspective of individual litigants, already quite arbitrary
and unfair. Many litigants assume that the Supreme Court exists to correct
injustice.233 Such individuals are often surprised to learn that the Court, for
the most part, could not care less about whether a particularly egregious
error happened in their particular case.
Consider a litigant who correctly believes that the circuit court signifi-
cantly erred in deciding a meritorious issue on appeal. The issue might be of
tremendous importance to that litigant—it might determine whether she
serves a prison sentence or is compensated for an injury. But whether the
Supreme Court will do anything about it depends on inscrutable and—from
the litigant’s perspective—arbitrary considerations having nothing to do
with whether the court of appeals ignored her issue.234 To get relief, the most
important thing is not demonstrating to the Court the magnitude of the
circuit court’s mistake in the litigant’s case. What matters instead is whether
other courts confronting the same issue decided it differently. If the litigant
cannot point to such a circuit conflict, she is highly unlikely to get the Court
to consider her case, no matter how good her arguments on the merits.
231. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (“As we have often stated, the ‘denial of a
writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case.’ ” (quoting
United States v. Carter, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923))).
232. We bracket the possibility that there is a viable constitutional objection to certiorari
itself. That is an interesting question, and perhaps a plausible argument could be made—but
the issue is far beyond our scope in this Article.
233. See, e.g., Kevin H. Smith, Justice for All?: The Supreme Court’s Denial of Pro Se Peti-
tions for Certiorari, 63 Alb. L. Rev. 381, 388 n.24 (1999) (“That the general public believes the
Supreme Court may correct any error committed by a lower court may be inferred from
public opinion surveys suggesting the Supreme Court may review and correct decisions of
state courts even in the absence of a constitutional or other federal issue.”).
234. The fact that the Court almost never explains its certiorari denials does not help this
situation. See Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court,
136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1067, 1081 (1988) (noting that the “Court has never adopted a requirement
that the Justices explain—either publicly or to their colleagues—the reasons underlying their
votes on certiorari petitions”).
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Under the lottery docket, such a litigant would at least have some
chance to get her case heard, the error corrected, and her rights vindicated.
Without doubt, that chance is a very small one. But we are concerned with
relative, not absolute, judgments. The slim possibility of review for a signifi-
cant but wholly isolated and factbound error makes the system, in our view,
fairer than our current system, in which the litigant asking for factbound
error correction has no realistic hope of getting the Court’s attention.
Nor do we think the lottery would necessarily harm the Court’s legiti-
macy. While the public might find the notion of random selection uncon-
ventional at first, over time the lottery docket could actually improve the
Court’s standing in the public eye. The lottery docket would likely result in
the Court correcting instances of real injustice that would otherwise have
resulted in certiorari denials without explanation. Of course, given the
Court’s limited capacities, and given our realistic ambitions for the lottery
docket, many erroneous rulings would still go uncorrected. But even just a
few high-profile instances of error correction might create an impression
with the public that choosing some cases at random serves valuable ends.
Moreover, there is a sense in which adoption of the lottery docket would
make the Court’s mechanism for selecting cases more honest. As Jon Elster
observes, “[t]he basic reason for using lotteries to make decision is honesty,”
which “requires us to recognize the pervasiveness of uncertainty . . . rather
than deny or avoid it.”235 Along similar lines, Bernard Harcourt has argued
for relying on randomization in criminal justice “[w]here our social scien-
tific theories run out.”236 Given that, for example, all our scientific learning
has given us no clear answers on how long a particular sentence should be,
Harcourt proposes that, instead of pretending to know the right answer,
judges instead “impose sentences, following conviction, based on a draw
from within a legislatively prescribed sentencing range.”237
Similarly, epistemic humility on the part of the justices might suggest a
greater reliance on randomization in the Court’s case-selection process. The
justices strive to use their discretionary power of certiorari to do the most
good for the federal judicial system. Yet the justices’ ability to actually know
where the Court’s help is most needed is quite limited. The justices cannot
even be aware of all that is happening in the circuit courts. Their knowledge
of the district courts is more limited still.238 And they have virtually no abil-
ity to know how the doctrinal rules they craft affect primary conduct in the
wider world outside the judicial system. Given these limitations, how could
we expect the Court to be confident that it could identify the legal issues
whose resolution could produce the greater social benefits? In circumstances
235. Elster, supra note 194, at 121.
236. Bernard E. Harcourt, Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment: On the Limits of Rea-
son and the Virtues of Randomization (A Polemic and Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century),
74 Soc. Res. 307, 328 (2007).
237. Id. at 329.
238. Cf. Heytens, supra note 109, at 2053–54 (describing the Supreme Court’s challenges
in attempting to monitor the work of the federal district courts).
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where actually identifying the important issues is so challenging, it is unsur-
prising that the Court relies so heavily on proxies like circuit splits. But—
rather than acting as if those proxies really are the only measures of impor-
tance that matter—a more honest approach would be to admit the limits of
those proxies. Using a lottery to pick some cases would mean acknowledging
the inherent uncertainty involved in trying to identify the most important
issues.
If nothing else, a random lottery would at least appear more honest to
those outside of One First Street. There may be good internal reasons why
the justices vote to grant or deny certiorari, but from an outsider’s perspec-
tive, certiorari is both inscrutable and arbitrary, with the decision turning
on factors that may have nothing to do with the specific case under re-
view.239 Lawyers and judges may understand the process, but it is especially
hard for nonlawyers to grasp given the conventional understanding that the
Supreme Court sits atop the hierarchy of courts.240 For the ordinary litigant,
might it not be better—that is, more transparent, understandable, and psy-
chologically satisfying—to acknowledge the randomness of Supreme Court
case selection by actually selecting cases at random? So too for the lawyer
who must explain the Supreme Court’s inevitable certiorari denial to her
client.
3. Scarce Resources
Another potential objection to the lottery docket is that requiring the
Court to decide clear-cut cases without significant legal implications would
stretch its resources. There is a sense in which this is true—the lottery
docket would entail additional work for the Court. That additional work
represents a private cost for the justices and their staffs. Whether it consti-
tutes a social cost depends on whether it would negatively affect the quality
of Supreme Court decisions.
Many commentators have noted the steep decline in the Court’s
caseload over the last twenty-five years.241 While the exact size of the Court’s
docket fluctuated during the twentieth century, from the 1960s until the late
239. As one federal circuit judge has observed, “Generally whether they [the Supreme
Court] are going to take a case . . . is a ‘crap shoot.’ ” Bowie & Songer, supra note 105, at 397.
Of course, it is only a “crap shoot” for the cases with some markers of cert-worthiness; the
obviously noncertworthy cases have no shot at being selected. See supra note 110 and accom-
panying text.
240. See Robert Laurence, Cert. Denied: Brief Commentary on Swanner v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Commission and City of Boerne v. Flores, Ark. L. Notes, 1998, at 87 (“And, of
course to the parties there is little difference between granting cert. and affirming, on the one
hand, and denying cert., on the other.”); id. (“Justice Holmes is said once to have responded to
a non-lawyer friend’s query by observing that God did not intend that the friend ever know
what a writ of certiorari is, and perhaps that is enough to allow folks to go about their busi-
nesses.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, Interdisciplinarity, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1217, 1219
(2002) (“With rare and brilliant exception . . . even the cleverest non-lawyers routinely garble
such summaries, seeing holdings in cert. denials . . . .”).
241. See sources cited supra note 5.
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1980s, the Court decided in the neighborhood of 150 cases per year.242 On
the other hand, the Roberts Court has averaged eighty-one certiorari grants
cases per term between October Term 2005 and October Term 2014.243 The
drop-off in cases is powerful evidence that the Court has decisionmaking
capacity in reserve.244 To be sure, we do not suggest that the Court return to
deciding 150 cases each year.245 As Randy Kozel and Jeffrey Pojanowksi ob-
serve, “[I]f the Supreme Court’s docket were markedly larger—as it was for
much of the twentieth century—its ability to function effectively as a
rulemaker would suffer.”246 Yet as Carolyn Shapiro observed in 2006 (when
the decline had not yet reached its current level), “There is a lot of room
between the eighty-five or ninety cases the Court currently decides and the
150 that most commentators view as too many.”247
Two caveats are necessary. First, we cannot rule out the possibility that
the cases the Court hears today are more complex or difficult, and thus take
more time to decide. But this is unlikely, and we take solace in scholarship
attributing the docket decline to factors other than case complexity, such as
the ideological dispersion of justices,248 the influence of the cert pool,249 and
an increasing unwillingness by justices to engage in error correction.250 We
also cannot rule out the possibility that the current number of cases is opti-
mal for Supreme Court decisionmaking—that is, that the Court’s post-de-
cline decisions are “better” than its older decisions.251 We know of no way to
empirically assess the quality of Supreme Court decisions, but Linda Green-
house reported in 2006 that the “justices themselves . . . seem mystified at
what they perceive as a paucity of cases that meet the court’s standard crite-
ria.”252 The justices’ “mystification” is hard to reconcile with the idea that
242. Owens & Simon, supra note 183, at 1228–29.
243. This figure is based on Table II(B) of the Harvard Law Review’s Supreme Court
statistics for each term. See, e.g., The Statistics, October Term 2014, supra note 5; The Supreme
Court, 2005 Term—The Statistics, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 372, 380 (2006).
244. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 Yale L.J.
3094, 3155–56 (2015) (“Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ‘shrunken docket’ suggests that it
has substantial unused capacity to control errors and promote consistency in the lower courts:
the Court’s docket remains roughly half of what it was decades ago.” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Hellman, supra note 5)).
245. See text accompanying supra note 183 (noting that Court heard more than 150 cases
per year in the 1980s).
246. Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 81, at 222.
247. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 335.
248. Owens & Simon, supra note 183, at 1275–77.
249. See Stras, supra note 60.
250. Hellman, supra note 5, at 429–38.
251. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Incredible Shrinking Docket, Trial, Mar. 2007, at 64, 64–65
(“What accounts for this dramatic downsizing? Perhaps the justices want to take fewer cases
and work harder on them.”).
252. Linda Greenhouse, Case of the Dwindling Docket Mystifies the Supreme Court: Legal
Scholars Offer Theories on a Drop in Appeals, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 2006, at A1, http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950CE0D61631F934A35751C1A9609C8B63 (on file
with the Michigan Law Review).
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the Court’s current docket size reflects an optimal decisionmaking
environment.
4. Percolation
A final objection to the lottery docket is the flip side of one of the argu-
ments in favor of the Court’s emphasis on circuit splits. One reason to wait
for splits is to let cases “percolate”: “The ideal of percolation . . . is to allow
several lower courts to consider a legal problem before the Supreme Court
rules on it, thus giving the High Court the benefit of the considered judg-
ments of a number of jurists.”253 By waiting to address difficult legal ques-
tions until an entrenched split has developed, the Court assures itself that
the best arguments on both sides have been aired.254 The risk with the lottery
docket is that, because it would force the Court to decide whatever legal
issues arose in the appeals, some legal issues would reach the Court before
they had a chance to steep sufficiently in the cauldron of the lower courts.
This is unquestionably a risk. The question, though, is whether this risk
outweighs the benefits of the lottery docket. The problem is that for many
legal issues, no meaningful percolation occurs: the first circuit court decides
the issue, the next one follows without a great deal of independent thought,
and so on before a consensus is reached. Giving those legal issues a chance at
Supreme Court review also means letting some other legal issues reach the
Court before a developed split has a chance to emerge. Whether one thinks
that cost outweighs the benefits depends on one’s view of percolation. One
of us has written about the value of percolation in other contexts,255 and this
is not the time or place to conclusively determine exactly how much benefit
percolation provides to the justices.
It suffices, though, to note that the percolation argument for the Court’s
approach to certiorari is not without its critics.256 And percolation itself is
not without significant costs. For example, the Court let the honest-services
fraud statute discussed above percolate in the lower courts for decades
before stepping in via the Skilling case.257 What good did all that percolation
provide? It is not clear, given that the Court endorsed a view of the statute
253. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 331.
254. See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 681, 716 (1984) (“The Supreme Court,
when it decides a fully percolated issue, has the benefit of the experience of those lower
courts.”).
255. See Ortman, supra note 153, at 247–48 (arguing that “two-tier judicial structures
offer the benefits of Supreme Court percolation in miniature”).
256. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 57 (1994) (“[T]he claim that inferior court
percolation is essential to provide a comprehensive array of analyses and approaches available
to the Supreme Court seems to inflate its contribution significantly.”).
257. See supra notes 136–139 and accompanying text.
March 2018] The Lottery Docket 749
narrower than that adopted by any circuit court.258 And by letting percola-
tion proceed for so long, the Court might have permitted dozens or hun-
dreds of defendants to be convicted of a federal crime based on broad
theories that the Court would ultimately repudiate. In that case, at least, it is
unclear whether percolation was worth the cost of admission.
Moreover, even if we agree that percolation is important, the lottery
docket does not necessarily make percolation impossible. The Court may be
able to resolve appeals in ways that avoid short-circuiting the lower court
decisionmaking process if an issue has the hallmarks of requiring percola-
tion (most commonly, complexity or difficulty).259 Sometimes it may be
possible to dispose of an appeal on narrow or fact-specific grounds. Where
that is so, and where percolation appears likely to be helpful, the Court
could thus avoid short-circuiting that process while still ruling on the merits
of a party’s appeal. We hesitate to suggest the Court do this too regularly,
because it would undermine what we see as one of the major benefits of our
proposal were the Court to avoid issues of law in favor of one-off, case-
specific rulings. But the possibility is there for situations where resolving a
major legal issue seems unwise or premature.
III. Implementation and Optimization
This Part addresses some finer details of the proposed lottery docket. We
aim not to specify the lottery’s contours with precision, but rather to indi-
cate the costs and benefits of plausible design choices. Section III.A discusses
whether litigants should have to affirmatively opt in to the lottery or
whether instead all final judgments should be automatically entered. Section
III.B addresses whether the lottery should be weighted in some way to reflect
the underlying distribution of issues in the trial courts. And Section III.C
complicates the proposal by considering whether final judgments of state
courts might properly be included in the lottery.
A. Opt-in or Automatic Entry
One key design choice concerns how the lottery “tickets” are assigned.
Do all final judgments of the circuit courts get entered into the lottery? Or
must the litigants opt in through some affirmative act? Automatic entry has
some appeal. If the goal is to give the Court a more representative sample of
what is happening in the lower courts, then ensuring that all the circuit
court decisions are entered would better serve that goal.
But automatic entry has some drawbacks. Normally, in our legal system,
a losing party must affirmatively exercise the right to appeal.260 Fail to file a
notice of appeal within the time limit, and you lose forever the right to
258. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
259. See Stewart A. Baker, A Practical Guide to Certiorari, 33 Cath. U. L. Rev. 611, 620
(1984).
260. Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1).
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further judicial review.261 Requiring some form of opt-in would be more
consistent with that traditional practice. One might even argue that without
affirmative opt-in, there is no longer an Article III case or controversy.262
There is also some danger that a few litigants (because they had not asked
for further review) might not even realize what had happened and might fail
to advance their cases despite winning the lottery. (Though perhaps this
problem would be solved by the existence of Supreme Court clinics and the
like, who would eagerly pounce on cases after they win the lottery—much as
they do now when certiorari is granted.)263
Moreover, one advantage of requiring opt-in is that it could be used as a
tool to reduce the inflow of certiorari petitions. What if litigants were given
the opportunity of choosing to enter the lottery or filing a certiorari peti-
tion? Under the current system, many petitions are filed with little realistic
chance of being granted because the cases implicate no splits and are other-
wise unimportant from the Court’s perspective. Such a petition represents a
Hail Mary—a desperate final attempt to get the Court to correct an error.
These petitions take time for the Court’s personnel to deal with.264 In a
world where litigants could choose between paying for numerous attorney
hours in preparing a certiorari petition that is almost certain to be denied,
or instead entering the lottery at no cost, and thus having a small, but
nonzero, chance of getting an appeal, we think many litigants would opt for
the lottery. The result might be fewer certiorari petitions filed, with a higher
percentage bearing the actual criteria the Court is looking for. That would
give the Court more time to carefully weigh the meritorious certiorari peti-
tions while still giving litigants with non-cert-worthy cases some chance of
having their cases reviewed.
That approach would, however, exacerbate the problem that the subset
of lottery cases would not be fully representative of all circuit cases. Cases
involving difficult purely legal questions might be underrepresented. But
perhaps this is not a problem because such cases are already so over-
represented in the certiorari docket. But it is not at all clear whether these
two effects perfectly cancel out. Ultimately, which approach to take may
depend in part on the separate design choice considered in the next Section.
261. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213–14 (2007) (holding that time limit for filing
notice of appeal in a civil case is jurisdictional).
262. The argument, which we note but do not resolve, is that unless a party affirmatively
seeks review in the Supreme Court (or at least acquiesces to review once granted), there are
not “interested parties asserting adverse claims” before the Court. See Note, What Constitutes a
Case or Controversy Within the Meaning of Article III of the Constitution, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 232,
233 (1927) (arguing that the existence of such parties is “[t]he first essential of a case or
controversy”). We are grateful to Tara Leigh Grove for pointing out the potential objection.
263. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Fisher, A Clinic’s Place in the Supreme Court Bar, 65 Stan. L. Rev.
137, 158 (2013) (relaying anecdote in which a respondent’s counsel received eighteen offers of
assistance from other lawyers within forty-eight hours of Court’s grant of certiorari).
264. They also consume the time of lawyers, who have to spend many hours drafting
petitions likely to be dismissed out of hand because they do not satisfy the conventional certio-
rari criteria. And of course they consume the resources of those lawyers’ paying clients.
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B. Weighted Draws
A further choice is whether to adopt a straight or weighted lottery. A
straight lottery would give every final circuit court decision an equal chance
of winning.265 A weighted lottery, on the other hand, would make certain
circuit decisions more likely to be selected, and others less likely.266 The
likely candidate is to assign weights that make the lottery docket resemble
the caseload of district courts.267 This Section explores the possibility of
weighting lottery entries to compensate for differences between circuit and
district dockets. As a lottery docket could be successfully implemented with
or without weighting, we take no ultimate position on the question.
At first cut, the choice between a straight and weighted lottery turns on
a trade-off between the lottery docket’s informational and accountability
mechanisms. As we have discussed, the informational value of the lottery
docket lies in the accurate information it would convey to the justices about
the type and distribution of disputes governed by the laws the Court inter-
prets.268 We have so far bracketed whether circuit court or district court
dockets are more representative of that universe of disputes, but there is a
good argument for district courts.269 Because many legal disputes are re-
solved out of court, no court’s docket perfectly reflects the universe of dis-
putes governed by law. Each step up the judicial ladder further cuts the
number of disputes, moving its docket further from the full universe. Dis-
trict court cases have, by definition, undergone one fewer round of cuts than
circuit court cases, likely making them more representative of all disputes.270
This makes it important to know whether there are systemic differences be-
tween circuit and district dockets. There are, as the tables below show.
265. See I. Glenn Cohen, Rationing Legal Services, 5 J. Legal Analysis 221, 246 (2013)
(“In simple lotteries, every eligible claimant is given an equal probability of getting the
good.”).
266. See id. (“Metaphorically, weighted lotteries use dice that are weighted toward certain
numbers, but still have a chance of rolling up on the unweighted ones.”).
267. An alternative weighting strategy would be to enhance the lottery docket’s accounta-
bility mechanism by assigning extra weight to cases from “underperforming” circuits. That
would, of course, raise difficult questions about defining what constitutes circuit un-
derperformance. We are indebted to Shay Lavie for suggesting this extension.
268. See supra notes 185–186 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
270. The only reason this would not be true is if the bias introduced by district court cases
that do not lead to appeal somehow cancelled out the bias created from disputes that settle
before reaching district court.
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Table 1. New Civil Cases, 2015–2016271
C a s e  T y p e  
P e rc e n ta g e  
o f  N e w  C iv il 
C a s e s   
P e rc e n ta g e  
o f  N e w  C iv il 
A p p e a ls  
D iffe re n c e  
C iv il R ig h ts  1 2 .9 %  1 8 .9 %  6 .0 %  
C o n tra c t 8 .5 %  7 .3 %  − 1 .2 %  
In te lle c tu a l P ro p e rty  4 .3 %  1 .2 %  − 3 .1 %  
L a b o r 6 .6 %  3 .0 %  − 3 .6 %  
O th e r 1 1 .8 %  1 0 .5 %  − 1 .4 %  
P r is o n e r  2 4 .4 %  4 8 .8 %  2 4 .4 %  
R e a l P ro p e rty  3 .1 %  1 .5 %  − 1 .6 %  
S e c u r it ie s  0 .4 %  0 .6 %  0 .2 %  
S o c ia l S e c u r ity  6 .3 %  2 .3 %  − 4 .0 %  
T o rts  2 1 .6 %  6 .0 %  − 1 5 .6 %  
Table 2. New Criminal Cases, 2015–2016272
O ffe n s e  T y p e  
P e rc e n ta g e  o f 
N e w  C r im in a l 
C a s e s  
P e rc e n ta g e  o f 
N e w  C r im in a l 
A p p e a ls  
D iffe re n c e  
V io le n t 3 .6 %  4 .3 %  0 .7 %  
P ro p e rty  1 4 .3 %  1 2 .6 %  − 1 .6 %  
D ru g s  3 2 .1 %  4 3 .6 %  1 1 .5 %  
F ire a rm s  a n d  E x p lo s iv e s  1 0 .9 %  1 6 .2 %  5 .4 %  
S e x  O ffe n s e s  4 .2 %  6 .6 %  2 .4 %  
J u s tic e  S y s te m s  1 .0 %  1 .2 %  0 .1 %  
Im m ig ra tio n  2 7 .0 %  1 2 .1 %  − 1 5 .0 %  
G e n e ra l O ffe n s e s  2 .3 %  2 .3 %  0 .1 %  
R e g u la to ry  1 .8 %  1 .1 %  − 0 .7 %  
T ra ff ic  2 .9 %  0 .0 %  − 2 .9 %  
271. The data, which is for the twelve-month period ending June 30, 2016, are from
Tables C-2 and B-7 of the Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, provided by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. See Table B-7: U.S. Courts of Appeals—Civil and
Criminal Cases Commenced, by Circuit and Nature of Suit or Offense, U.S. Courts, http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_b7_630.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BD7-
JE7Z] [hereinafter Table B-7]; Table C-2: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis
of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
data_tables/stfj_c2_630.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW77-C3ND] [hereinafter Table C-2].
272. Table B-7, supra note 271; Table D-2: Criminal Defendants Commenced, by Offense,
U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_d2_630.2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6XB-7AEJ] [hereinafter Table D-2]. Two caveats are necessary about these
figures. First, the available data count district court matters by defendants, but circuit court
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Negative numbers in the “Difference” column reflect case types that are un-
derrepresented on appeal (relative to district court dockets), while positive
numbers show types that are overrepresented. By giving extra weight to
cases underrepresented on appeal, the lottery docket could compensate for
these imbalances and make it more representative of district court caseloads.
Over time, the justices would acquire information about the type and distri-
bution of disputes that occupy the district courts, while still reviewing cir-
cuit court decisions.
On the other hand, a weighted lottery would detract from the lottery
docket’s accountability function. Circuit judges hearing overrepresented
cases would know that their decisions are especially unlikely to win the lot-
tery, attenuating the accountability that the lottery docket offers in those
cases. This may not be of much practical significance, however, as the
probability of lottery-docket review will be small in every case. Notwith-
standing the weighting, moreover, the chance of Supreme Court review will
be nonzero even in overrepresented quotidian cases, which, we suggested
above, is the central advantage (in this respect) of the lottery docket.273
While weighting the lottery would diminish the accountability benefit of
adopting a lottery docket, the effect may thus be small.
A more significant objection is that weighting lottery entries would in-
troduce a series of administrability concerns. While these obstacles could be
overcome, they introduce costs that an unweighted lottery would not en-
counter. We will note three potential difficulties, but there are surely more.
First, the lottery administrator would need to decide what characteris-
tics of district court cases should be weighted.274 The obvious choice is to
assign weights by case “type,” but this raises further level-of-generality
problems. The broadest cut is between civil versus criminal cases. Because
criminal cases tend to be overrepresented in circuit courts,275 extra weight
could be assigned to civil lottery entries. But this would be a fairly crude
accounting. Alternatively, cases could be assigned to categories—for instance
violent offenses and property crimes on the criminal side, and civil rights
and real property cases on the civil ledger, as the official judiciary statistics
currently do.276 Or the weighting could be more granular, for instance, iden-
tifying particular criminal offenses and civil causes of action. The choices
matter. For example, in the year ending June 30, 2016, the category “prop-
erty offenses” made up a slightly smaller portion of circuit courts’ criminal
matters by case. This has the potential to skew results if multidefendant cases are more likely in
some case types than others. Second, approximately 7% of criminal appeals are listed as
unclassified. If the unclassified appeals (which were disregarded for purposes of calculating
docket percentages) are skewed by case type, that too could distort the results.
273. See supra Section II.B.2.
274. For instance, if it turns out that governmental plaintiffs are overrepresented in circuit
dockets, weighting could be used to boost cases with private plaintiffs.
275. In the year ending June 30, 2016, criminal cases accounted for 22% of new federal
district court cases (including multi-defendant cases), and 30% of new circuit court cases. See
Table B-7, supra note 271; Table C-2, supra note 271; Table D-2, supra note 272.
276. Table B-7, supra note 271; Table C-2, supra note 271; Table D-2, supra note 272.
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dockets than district courts’ criminal dockets, meaning that property crimes
were underrepresented on appeal.277 But health-care fraud, one component
of property crime, was slightly overrepresented in appeals.278 Whether
health-care fraud decisions would receive a positive or negative weight turns
on the level of generality selected. A weighted lottery would have to sort
through these difficult level-of-generality issues.
Second, a weighted lottery would confront the problem of assigning
weights to cases that originate in circuit courts, most significantly in admin-
istrative law cases. Many of the most important cases in administrative law
originate in circuit courts pursuant to “direct review” statutes.279 If weights
are assigned to make the lottery docket resemble district court caseloads, the
direct review cases would be absent from the lottery docket entirely.280 A
weighted lottery docket would need to determine what, if any, priority to
give direct review cases.
Third, in a weighted lottery system, someone must continuously moni-
tor federal dockets and update the weights. That by itself makes a weighted
lottery costlier to administer than a straight lottery. Moreover, as the preced-
ing discussion shows, assigning weights involves difficult choices with distri-
butional consequences. The lottery administrator in a weighted system
would thus have significant political power, raising a further institutional
design question of who, or what office, gets the assignment. In a straight
lottery, on the other hand, once the size of the docket is fixed and the
method of randomization chosen,281 actually running the lottery would be a
mechanical task without significant political implications.
C. State Cases
Thus far we have assumed that only federal circuit court decisions
would be included in the lottery. In principle, the final decisions of state
courts could also be eligible to enter the lottery when they implicate ques-
tions of federal law. If there are categories of federal law litigated more com-
monly in state courts than in federal courts, including state cases could make
the lottery docket an even better antidote to the informational and missing
cases problems identified earlier. Extending the lottery to state cases, how-
ever, introduces complexities not seen in the federal context. This Section
evaluates two such complexities. Once again, because a lottery docket could
be implemented with or without state cases, we take no ultimate position.
First, whether to include state cases depends in part on one’s theory of
the Supreme Court’s role in supervising state courts. While the Supreme
277. See Table B-7, supra note 271; Table D-2, supra note 272.
278. See Table B-7, supra note 271; Table D-2, supra note 272.
279. See Ortman, supra note 153, at 235 n.57, 236.
280. One of us has argued elsewhere that an appellate-review mechanism would improve
judicial decisionmaking in direct-review cases. Id. at 244–59.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 173–174 and text following note 183.
March 2018] The Lottery Docket 755
Court’s supervisory role over federal courts is relatively straightforward,282
its relationship to state courts is more complicated. Jason Mazzone argues
that the Supreme Court’s “supremacy” on questions of federal constitutional
law, vis-à-vis state courts, is a twentieth-century myth.283 Under the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, Mazzone notes, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to
review cases in which a state court held that a state statute violated the fed-
eral constitution.284 State courts interpreted the Supreme Court’s limited ju-
risdiction as negating the possibility that the Supreme Court was “the
common arbiter for the decision of [federal] questions.”285 Acknowledging
an independent role for state courts in interpreting federal law makes sense,
according to Mazzone, because “[t]hough they apply federal law, state courts
are no more lower federal courts than the state legislatures are subunits of
Congress or the state governors agents of the federal executive branch.”286
Mazzone’s view is, of course, contestable. James Pfander, for instance, argues
that when they decide federal claims, state courts are best understood as
inferior tribunals constituted by Congress under Article I, Section 8, and
thus necessarily inferior to the Supreme Court.287
Whether the state courts have an independent role to play with respect
to the development of federal law is well beyond our scope here. But if the
independent-role story is right, it complicates the accountability argument
for a lottery docket. The accountability of state judges deciding federal law,
on the independent-role view, depends on state political processes, not Su-
preme Court reversal.288 Subjecting state court decisions to random auditing
would thus—for proponents of an independent role—represent a cost, not a
benefit, of applying the lottery to state cases. It remains possible that the
informational and missing case arguments for a lottery docket would offset
this cost, but the burden on those arguments would be greater.
Second, at a practical level, the lottery would need to identify which
state cases were eligible for the lottery. Defining what sort of federal ques-
tions make a case eligible for the lottery would be simple. The starting point
would likely be the doctrines currently governing Supreme Court certiorari
review of state judgments. Thus, only an issue that could properly be the
basis of certiorari review could be the basis of an appeal through the lottery
docket. Figuring out whether a particular case is eligible, then, would require
a careful analysis of the record to determine whether any federal issues are
282. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text.
283. Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 979,
982 (2010).
284. Id. at 983; see also Frost, supra note 123, at 1617 (“Nor did the [1789] Act give the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to review all state courts’ rulings concerning federal
law.”).
285. Mazzone, supra note 283, at 987 (quoting Skelly v. Jefferson Branch of the State Bank
of Ohio, 9 Ohio St. 606, 612 (1859), rev’d, 66 U.S. 436 (1861)).
286. Id. at 1045 (footnotes omitted).
287. James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality
of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 191 (2007).
288. Mazzone, supra note 283, at 1050–57.
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present and properly preserved, and whether Supreme Court review of those
issues would be barred by the adequate-and-independent-state-ground
doctrine.289
What would be necessary, however, is some mechanism that sorted eli-
gible and ineligible state appeals before they reached the justices. The lottery
docket’s point is for the justices to confront federal questions that would
otherwise evade review, not to make threshold determinations about
whether a case has federal questions. Perhaps the cases initially selected in
the lottery could be reviewed by the justice’s law clerks in order to evaluate
whether federal issues were present. Such a task would be similar to the
review for adequate and independent state grounds that is already part of
the law clerks’ review of certiorari petitions from state court judgments.290
To make this sorting more efficient, one could require the lottery entrants to
file a notice of federal issues stating which issues they hoped to raise on
appeal. While these details of the screening process need not ultimately de-
tain us here, there is little doubt that they would add to the administration
costs of the lottery docket.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s current certiorari process has on occasion been
compared to a lottery, in its unpredictability and apparent randomness.291
To those who file certiorari petitions, it certainly must feel like one. Yet, in
our view, the problem with the certiorari process is that it is not truly a
lottery. A real lottery system would expose the Court to a broader swath of
cases, increase the Court’s ability to control the lower courts, and increase
the likelihood that the Court would address important legal questions that
might otherwise escape its notice. Picking cases for review at random might
at first seem strange or capricious. But it would be ultimately fairer to liti-
gants than the current approach—at the very least, it would be no more
unfair. At first, the justices might bridle at being asked to spend their pre-
cious time resolving some seemingly trivial appeals. But making the High
289. The Court’s adequate-and-independent-state-ground jurisprudence has addressed
the circumstances when a federal issue can properly be reviewed by the Court notwithstanding
an apparent state law ruling supporting the judgment. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1042 (1983) (holding that, when a state court decision that rests on both federal and
state law, the Court will assume no adequate and independent state ground exists absent a
clear statement to that effect by the state court).
290. See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 285 (“Most law clerks review petitions for certiorari
with a presumption against granting coupled with a kind of checklist of reasons not to
grant. . . . Is there an independent state law ground for the lower court judgment? Deny.”).
291. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Cases of the Century, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 585, 601
(2000) (“From prison, Gideon entered the certiorari lottery.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, Rethinking
Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 Va. Tax Rev.
1, 63 (2008) (“[S]tate courts can choose to play what can be called ‘the cert lottery,’ holding
for the home team while betting on the unlikelihood that aggrieved taxpayers can get the U.S.
Supreme Court to hear their cases.”).
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Court confront a handful of low-profile cases every year would serve the
most important ends.
